Ellen Anderson v. Eugene E. Doms : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Ellen Anderson v. Eugene E. Doms : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Larry R. Keller; Cohne, Rappaport and Segal; Attorney for Defendants/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Larry A. Kirkham; Cannon, Kirkham and Robinson; Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-
Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Anderson v. Doms, No. 20010712 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3427
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally; DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-
Appellants 
v. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010712-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
Appeal from a Modified Judgment and Minute Entry of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, dated July 7,2001, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge. 
LARRY A. KIRKHAM #1832 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801) 255-7475 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellant 
w V 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee [""": \J ." , !'•..) 
U'~' kT.S 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally; DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-
Appellants 
v. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010712-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
Appeal from a Modified Judgment and Minute Entry of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, dated July 7,2001, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge. 
LARRY A. KIRKHAM #1832 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801) 255-7475 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellant 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
' , r>3als 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
i -^Ly 5 2002 
Pautette Stagg 
Clark utm Court 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally; DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-
Appellants 
v. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010712-CA 
LETTER OF CITATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
LARRY A. KIRKHAM #1832 
8619 South Sandy Parkway 
Building A, Suite 111 
Sandy, UT, 84070 
Telephone: (801) 255-7475 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellant 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
Pertinent and sigi lificai it case pi ecedei it at id a.i itl i :)i it; > 1 las coi i lie tc tt le attentr : i i. of 
rhliinliiiil'AppcllanH mssAppHIre Poms in llu ;»bu\i -nililkd matter, and this Letter of 
Citation of Supplemental \uthority is submitted to pursuant to the provision.s of Rule 24(i) 
of the I rtah RuL* ol A|jpUi.m_ \ iou_dure„ 
r
 II I lis ne ' / ai ithc i it; / is tl le case of I -t 'e v. St in lers, 155 I ftal i • \ d < J. R ep. 59 (2002 I J T 
' ^PP). 
The relevant holding of a pane] of this court is found at paragraphs 11 and 12 at page 
< ' ipeals i e v ei sed tl ie ti ial :> : i in I: !: ;; 7 sta .( ' <;! ' )e ca I I see 
Homing in me iecord to buppoit the trial court's adoption ol am iuMiri;. . .neither rartv 
successfully introduced e\idence rf iK property \aim ihiongh cither an appraisal <• an 
expert opinioi .:. -r. .• ., ... ,. , . 
i •: J i ui N opellee/Cross-
Appellant'o Opening Brief; Pom! i ' >l nages 5-S of Defendant DomA Reply Brief; and 
Point IV at pages 12- i n • j m;. kqn\ Rnci ol Appellee^ t io>»>-Appeiuints. 
DA" riil) tin s > (hi \ i»I . \ / < - C ^ M / - ^ ^ MM) J". 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
iW^R^ELLER " ^ 
Attome^for^D efen dan t/App ell ant/Cr o s s -
Appellee Doms 
CERTIFICA I h OF SERVICE 
I , ie reb\ ^e i l l l ) Hull . u i u ^ u a llu%_ and a ) U i . i , . • ,1.. K , 
by first class U.S. postage nrmaid, this3rA dav oi i WlCL^Ui- i 2002. to. 
I.;UT\ A Kirkham 
Bryan \\ . Cannon & Associntcs 
8619 South Sandy Park\va\ 
Building A. Suite ! I I 
V^tU^ L);UUy^ 
F:\Chantel\Lany\Doms\Letter.Citation.wpd 
—. ...wwiuic, according to tiie facts of this case, the 
very intent relied upon by the majority is not 
supported, and child kidnaping would merge into 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 
<[73 I would remand for sentencing upon the 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child conviction. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
1. Diaz challenges the March 25, 1999 sentencing hearing, 
the merger analysis, and his sentence, specifically the 
prosecutor's post-merger role in deciding upon which crime 
Diaz would be sentenced and the related decision not to 
sentence on aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 
2. Because I believe both kidnaping charges merged into the 
host crime, I do not here address the propriety of dealing 
with an inconsistent verdict where the inconsistency was 
arguably eliminated as a matter of law. 
3. The specific intent element has since been removed from 
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. §76-5-301.1 (Supp. 2001). 
Cite as 
455 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Dan F. LEE, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Dora SANDERS aka Dora Branin, and John Does 
MO, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
[No. 20000945-CA 
FILED: 09/06/02 
2002 UTApp 281 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
ATTORNEYS: 
Howard Chuntz, Orem, for Appellants 
Ralph C. Amott, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench. Davis, and Thorne. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
?THORNE, Judge: 
J l Dora Sanders appeals from the trial court's order 
determining her money interest in a partnership 
>perty. We reverse and remand. 
W BACKGROUND 
B2 In 1994, Sanders and Dan Lee jointly purchased 
Kroperty in American Fork, Utah. The couple resided 
Ira the property and shared expenses through 
Btovember 1996 when Sanders moved. From that time 
lorward, Lee assumed all responsibility for the costs 
Bssociated with the property, including the mortgage, 
insurance, taxes, and maintenance costs. 
H3 In October 1999, after attempting to refinance or 
pell the property and learning that Sanders was still a 
Kamed title holder, Lee filed suit against Sanders in an 
Kttcmpt to quiet title, Lee's complaint listed three 
jfeiuses of action: (1) equitable dissolution and 
Pvision of partnership property and/or judgment for 
E- _ — -
contribution and payments of plaintiff; (2) quiet title; 
and (3) accommodation. In addition to asking the 
court for an order quieting title in his name, Lee 
requested an order 
dissolving the partnership of the parties [sic], 
. . . and an accounting and determination of 
all partnership proceeds and contributions, 
and . . . an order determining the relative 
equitable value of each parties contribution to 
the investment property, which [Lee] believes 
should be a finding of 100% interest in the 
property to [Lee] and 0% to [Sanders]. 
Sanders filed an answer, and, on June 6, 2000, after 
sufficient time had passed to permit the Parties an 
opportunity to conduct discovery, a trial was held. 
<I4 Following the trial, the court issued a 
memorandum decision wherein the court found, inter 
alia, that the Parties had purchased and recorded the 
property as joint tenants. The court also determined 
that "based upon principles of equity and partnership, 
the Parties, though unmarried[,] should share equally 
in the amount of equity found by the court." The court 
then proceeded to determine that equity was best 
determined by examining the change in the amount 
owed on the mortgage over the time that the Parties 
jointly occupied the property. The trial court then 
determined that the amount owed on the property had 
decreased $1160.97 during the period in question, 
awarded Sanders one-half of that amount, and quieted 
title in Lee's name. 
?5 Sanders subsequently filed a Motion to Amend 
the Judgment arguing that the trial court used an 
incorrect method to determine equity, and asserting 
that because neither party had asked the trial court to 
determine the equity vested in the property, and 
because neither party had presented any evidence of 
the value of the property, the court had erred in 
making its equity determination. The trial court 
denied the motion, concluding that while "neither 
party [had] presented evidence of the property's actual 
or appraised value at trial," both Parties "put at issue 
the value of the real property at issue in the lawsuit." 
Sanders now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 Sanders argues that the trial court's decision to 
determine the amount of equity vested in the property 
was improper because the issue of equity was neither 
pleaded nor argued by the Parties. Whether an issue 
was properly before the trial court presents a question 
of law, which we review for correctness. See Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 105 
(Utah 1998); Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, 
Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). 
ANALYSIS 
TJ Sanders argues that because the property equity 
issue was neither pleaded nor tried by consent, the 
trial court erred in determining the equity amount. A 
trial court's findings should fit "within the framework 
of the petition as originally drawn, or as amended" 
and should be supported by the evidence presented. In 
re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 663 
(1950). Under rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a trial court may infer an amendment to 
the pleadings if the issue is tried by the Parties' 
express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
"Implied consent to try an issue may be found where 
one party raises an issue material to the other party's 
case or where evidence is introduced without 
objection, [and] where it appear[s] that the parties 
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understood the evidence [was] to be aimed at the 
unpleaded issue." Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 
785 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (second and third 
alterations in original) (citations and quotations 
omitted). "A trial court may not base its decision on 
an issue that was tried inadvertently." Archuleta v. 
Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998) (citations 
and quotations omitted); see also Combe, 680 P.2d at 
736 (holding that a "court may not grant judgment for 
relief which is neither requested by the pleadings nor 
within the theory on which the case was tried"). 
18 In the instant case, in its ruling denying Sanders's 
motion to amend the judgment, the trial court 
concluded that while "neither party [had] presented 
evidence of the property's actual or appraised value at 
trial," both Parties "put at issue the value of the real 
property at issue in the lawsuit." We disagree. 
19 In his complaint, Lee asked the trial court to 
determine, inter alia, "the relative equitable value of 
each parties [sic] contribution to the investment 
property." Lee also asked the court for "an accounting 
and determination of all partnership proceeds." 
However, the thrust of Lee's prayer for relief is found 
in his request for a determination that he possessed 
sole interest in the property, thus entitling him to an 
order quieting title in his name. We have thoroughly 
reviewed both the complaint and the answer and can 
nowhere find any language that would empower the 
trial court to determine the actual value of the 
property or to reduce the Parties' relative interests to 
a money amount. We therefore conclude that the trial 
court erred in determining that value had been put at 
issue in the pleadings.1 
110 Moreover, while it is true that a trial court 
may infer an amendment to the pleadings when the 
Parties try an issue by express or implied consent, "[a] 
trial court may not base its decision on an issue that 
was tried inadvertently." Archuleta, 969 P.2d at 413 
(citations and quotations omitted). Here, we have 
reviewed the trial record and, absent Sanders's 
unsuccessful attempt to introduce an appraisal of the 
property into evidence, there is nothing to suggest that 
the Parties ever presented the issue of Property value 
to the trial court. Accordingly, to the extent mat the 
trial court may have relied either upon evidence 
submitted by the Parties, or trial testimony, to support 
its decision, the trial court erred in deciding the issue 
of the property's value. 
111 Finally, even assuming that the issue of the 
Parties' relative equity interests was properly before 
the court, we can see nothing in the record to support 
the trial court's adoption of any figure, let alone the 
figure actually adopted by the trial court. "The term 
'equity' is described as the money value of a property 
or of an interest in property in excess of claims or 
liens against it. . . . It is the value in excess of [the] 
mortgage or other liens." Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 
1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) (footnotes omitted). Here, 
after hearing all of the testimony and examining all of 
the evidence, the trial court found 
that per exhibit 23 the purchase price of the 
property was $51,296.75 as of September 14, 
1994. The Court also finds that from exhibit 
16, as of October 31, 1996, the time of 
separation of the Parties, $50,135[.]78 was 
due and owing on the property. Subtracting 
that amount from the original price, the Court 
finds that the equity established in the 
property by the evidence is $ 1,160.97. 
Considering the evidence, the court finds that 
based upon principles of equity and 
partnership, the Parties, though unmarried 
should divide equally the amount of equity 
found by the Court. 
112 As previously discussed, neither party 
successfully introduced evidence of the property value 
through either an appraisal or an expert opinion. In 
fact, as evidenced by the trial court's decision, the 
only information concerning the "value" of the 
property focused on the price the Parties paid for the 
property in 1994 and the amount owing at the time the 
Parties separated. In a time of fluctuating property 
values, real estate equity cannot be determined simply 
through the examination of changes in mortgage 
principal over time, as the trial court has done here. 
Therefore, had the trial court been properly presented 
with the issue of relative equity interests, its equity 
determination was improper. 
113 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's 
decision to determine the Parties' relative monetary 
interests in the property and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
114 I CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. The trial court's ruling seems to suggest that both Parties 
placed the value of the property at issue. However, Sanders 
filed only a responsive pleading, i.e., an answer. Through 
this document, Sanders asked only that the trial court order 
the property sold and the resulting equity divided equally 
between the Parties. This request lends no support to the trial 
court's conclusion. 
DAVIS, Judge (dissenting): 
115 I believe the trial court did not err in 
determining the equity value of the property. Because 
the equity of the home was an issue from the 
beginning, the parties had adequate notice that it 
would be part of the litigation. See Berger v. Berger, 
713 P.2d 695, 699 (Utah 1985) (holding that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion where value was an 
issue at trial and the court's valuation was based upon 
evidence presented and a suggested valuation 
method). In fact, Sanders made an attempt to present 
documentary market valuation evidence, which the 
trial court, in response to Lee's objection, deemed 
inadmissible hearsay. Sanders also attempted to testify 
regarding an appraisal performed in 1997; however, 
in response to a similar objection, the testimony was 
not allowed. Thereafter, Sanders made no further 
attempts to produce or present any additional 
evidence.1 Clearly, the issue was before the court and 
Sanders cannot now argue that it was an abuse of 
discretion for the trial court to have reached the issue. 
116 Further, it is not an abuse of discretion for a 
trial court to base its valuation of property solely on 
evidence presented by one party where the other party 
failed to provide contrary evidence. See Elman v. 
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,132, 45 P.3d 176; see also 
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470-71 (Utah 1984) 
(holding that the party objecting to the valuation 
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method has the burden of offering further evidence). 
"Having failed to produce such evidence, [Sanders] 
may not claim that the trial court erred in considering 
the information [supplied]." Argyle, 688 P.2d at 470. 
117 I would therefore affirm the trial court and 
find that the issue of valuation was clearly before the 
trial court and that the trial court did not err in 
determining the equity value based upon the evidence 
presented. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
ill. The evidence admitted included the original mortgage 
balance, the mortgage balance at the time of separation, and 
?a 1999 County Property Tax Valuation that was not relevant 
'because of the time period it represented. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Glade Leon PARDUHN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Natalie Buchi BENNETT, Allison Buchi, 
Annabelle Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi 
(the "Buchi Children" and Joanne Buchi, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20010811 
[No. 20010926 
FILED: 09/06/02 
2002 UT 93 
miird District, Salt Lake County 
phe Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
|The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
ATTORNEYS: 
E',: P. Bryan Fishburn, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
1^ Martin S. Tanner, Susan Black Dunn, Tim Dalton 
Dunn, Salt Lake City, for defendants 
m 
m^This opinion is subject to revision before final 
E> publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Ifc BACKGROUND 
| k On May 23, 1979, Brad Buchi and Glade 
;duhn agreed to form an equal partnership under 
name University Texaco Company and to conduct 
Rservice station business. The partners added a 
fey-sell agreement to the partnership agreement, 
Hjnich provided that "in the event of death of either" 
Ktner, the survivor would purchase the decedent's 
ffiferest in the "business" and "do with the business as 
sees fit." They also agreed that the buy-out would 
funded by the proceeds of life insurance policies 
each other's lives, the premiums of which would be 
jd by the partnership. 
On January 25, 1984, Buchi and Parduhn 
nded their partnership agreement to increase the 
[ount of the insurance coverage from $20,000 to 
'100,000, and purchased life insurance coverage lor 
SLamount. On January 4, 1989, without amending 
the partnership agreement, Buchi and Parduhn again 
increased the insurance coverage on each other's lives 
to $300,000 and $250,000 respectively. The $300,000 
policy on Buchi's life named Parduhn as the 
beneficiary and "buy/sell partner" as the purpose for 
the policy. 
13 Buchi and Parduhn operated their business for 
eighteen years. Early in 1997, they contracted to sell 
their business and service stations to Blackett Oil 
Company. They closed their deal on July 14, 1997, 
transferred the business assets to Blackett, and ceased 
to do business. Buchi died on August 7, 1997. On 
November 6, 1997, Parduhn filed an action to 
establish his right to the proceeds of the insurance 
policy on Buchi's life. Buchi's wife and children 
argued that they should receive the proceeds under the 
buy-sell agreement. Parduhn filed a motion for 
summary judgment, which the trial court denied on 
the grounds that there were genuine issues of material 
fact. 
^4 In its August 27, 2001 Memorandum Decision, 
the trial court awarded the insurance proceeds to 
Buchi's survivors, determining that the buy-sell 
agreement remained effective after the business and 
its assets were sold, that the insurance policy's 
designation of Parduhn as the beneficiary was 
ambiguous, and that "Buchi intended that [Parduhn] 
not be the actual beneficiary but the beneficiary only 
to pass on the proceeds to Buchi's survivors." Parduhn 
appeals both the trial court's denial of his motion for 
summary judgment and its Memorandum Decision. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
15 Parduhn challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion for summary judgment. "We review the trial 
court's grant or denial of a motion for summary 
judgment for correctness and accord no deference to 
the trial court's conclusions of law." Malibu Inv. 
Corp. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30,112, 996 P.2d 1043. 
Parduhn also challenges the trial court's conclusion 
that the insurance contract was ambiguous. "Whether 
a contract term is ambiguous is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness." Sharon Steel v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur., 931 P.2d 127, 134 (Utah 1997). 
16 Finally, Parduhn challenges the trial court's 
conclusion that the buy-sell agreement was effective 
at the time of Buchi's death. "[W]hether a contract 
exists between parties is a question of law which we 
review for correctness." John Deere Co. v. A &. H 
Equip., 876 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ANALYSIS 
17 The insurance policy unambiguously designates 
Parduhn as the beneficiary. Thus, we reverse the trial 
court's determination that the insurance policy's 
designation of Parduhn as the beneficiary was 
ambiguous. Accordingly, the key issue remaining is 
whether the buy-sell agreement remained in effect 
after the partners sold the partnership • business 
because the trial court's ultimate conclusion hinges on 
this question. Because Parduhn directly challenges the 
trial court's conclusion that the buy-sell agreement 
remained effective, only after we review this ruling 
can we examine the parties' respective rights to the 
proceeds of the insurance policy. 
18 The trial court ruled that "because it was still in 
effect at Buchi's death, the buy-sell agreement, if it 
existed, was still in effect."1 We hold that the trial 
court erred in this conclusion because Buchi and 
Parduhn contracted to sell and sold the major assets 
and "the business" to Blackett Oil Company. Thus 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 1 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT 
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BARS MOST OF PLAINTIFFS' 
ARGUMENTS, AND ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE 
WITHOUT MERIT 4 
(1) Plaintiffs cannot argue that Doms is not entitled to the return of 
interest paid under the Trust Deed Note; even so, Doms is 
entitled to the return of this interest 5 
(a) Plaintiffs' argument (here and later) that interest 
should be applied as a "setoff to fair rental value 
fails because the trial court found that no fair 
rental value exists in this case 6 
(b) The law of the case is that Doms is entitled to all 
sums paid to Plaintiffs on the contract 8 
(2) The law of the case doctrine bars Plaintiffs' attempt to retry the 
rescission issue; in any event, rescission is appropriate because 
the parties can be returned to the status quo 10 
(a) The encroachments on the property matured 
before Doms' occupancy; thus no encroachment 
affects the parties' ability to be returned to the 
status quo 11 
(b) The ability of the parties to be returned to the 
status quo is unaffected by the death of one of 
Plaintiffs 12 
(c) The ability of the parties to be returned to the 
status quo is unaffected by McCoy's "subsequent 
transfer" to Doms 14 
(3) The law of the case is that it is irrelevant whether Doms or his 
partner made the payments; and that all four Plaintiffs are 
responsible for repayment 15 
(4) Plaintiffs are procedurally barred from challenging the trial 
court's refusal to award rent; nonetheless, there is no basis for 
awarding rent 17 
(5) It is the law of the case that Doms was to receive "net payments 
paid," which necessarily includes taxes 19 
(6) Plaintiffs are precluded from raising the prejudgment interest 
issue now because they failed to raise it in the lower court; even 
so, prejudgment interest is required under these circumstances 20 
CONCLUSION 24 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ADDENDUMS TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ADDENDUMS 
u 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 18, 23 
Anderson v. Doms Memorandum Decision (Not For Publication) 
920653-CA, filed November 4, 1994 11, 12, 13 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) 20 
Bank of California v. Connolly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1974) 13 
Bechardv. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946) 6, 7, 19, 20 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991) 18, 19, 21, 22 
Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) 13 
BLTInvestment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) 23 
Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982) 13 
Brink v. Larsen, 411 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 19 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989) 21 
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995) 21, 22 
DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 835 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997) 20 
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980) 13 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976) 18, 19 
Gildea v. Guardian Title Company of Utah, 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543 4, 10 
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 9 
In re Estate ofMalliet, 649 P.2d 18 (Utah 1982) 13 
In re Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986) 13 
iii 
CASES Page 
In re: Estate of Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975) 13 
Libassi v. Chelli, 615 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994 5, 6, 20 
Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A. 1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914) 8, 19 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) 18 
Reedv. Sixth Judicial District Court, 341 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1959) 13 
Shoreline Devel., Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . . 22, 23 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989) 13 
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995) 4 
Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1976) 23 
Water & Energy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, f 15, 48 P.3d 888 17 
Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. App. 1978) 13 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5) 21 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. § 75-3-801 and § 75-3-803 13 
U.C.A. § 15-1-1 24 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 514, at 998 (1964) 15 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of D.C. 
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally; DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellees/Cross-
Appellants 
v. 
EUGENE E. POMS and 
MICHAEL R. McCOY, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010712-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE 
Appeal from a Modified Judgment and Minute Entry of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, dated July 7,2001, the 
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge. 
LARRY A. KIRKHAM #1832 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801) 255-7475 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellant 
LARRY R. KELLER #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or rules determinative of or 
pertinent to the issues presented for review is contained in the body of this Reply Brief, 
Doms' opening Brief, or the Addenda. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Several inaccurate statements are made in Plaintiffs' Statement of the Case. Plaintiffs 
state that "the Statement of Facts in Doms' Brief contains a number of factual inaccuracies;" 
however, such statement is in error and Doms maintains that all Statements of Fact in his 
Opening Brief are supported by the record and prior decisions of this Court as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs argue "Doms states that Plaintiffs received a $82,500.00 payment on 
the purchase price but does not indicate the source of these payments." This is not an 
inaccurate statement by Doms. The trial court concluded, and the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision in Anderson v. Doms^ 1999 UT App. 207, 984 P.2d 392, (hereafter cited as 
Anderson II) (See Addendum 1) specifically found that "Doms is entitled to a refund of 
monies paid as one of the original buyers of the properly, and as the successor in interest to 
McCoy and DomCoy." Anderson II at^[21 n.12. Therefore, this Court has previously ruled 
that the source of the monies paid is immaterial and Doms is entitled to a refund of all 
monies paid. Thus, this statement in Doms' Opening Brief is not inaccurate and the 
distinction made by Plaintiffs is immaterial based upon the law of the case doctrine. (See 
Appellant's Opening Brief, Point II). 
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2. Plaintiffs also argue that "in paragraphs f and g, Doms indicates monthly 
payments . . . were made but does not indicate the source of these payments." This statement 
by Doms in the Statement of Facts is indeed specifically accurate, and the source of the 
payments is immaterial to this Court's review based upon the same argument made in the 
preceding paragraph. 
3. Plaintiffs also argue that "there is no evidence in the record as to who paid the 
delinquent taxes, penalties and interest...." Again, the trial court concluded as a matter of 
law, and this Court ultimately upheld that ruling, that "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies 
paid as one of the original buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy 
and DomCoy" Anderson II at \ 21 n. 12. Plaintiffs' distinction is made immaterial by the 
law of the case as argued in Doms' Opening Brief, Point II. 
4. Plaintiffs also claim as inaccurate Doms' statement in paragraph n of his 
Statement of Facts in his Opening Brief that, on remand, the trial court found that the 
conveyance of the property from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms 
holding "clear title to the property." Doms cited the lower court's Amended Judgment (R. 
6692) and this was indeed the holding of the trial court. This Court looked at that precise 
holding of the trial court in Anderson II and held: "On remand, the trial court found that the 
conveyance of the property from Summit County to Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms 
holding cclear title to the property'. Therefore, Plaintiffs' arguments premised on the 
contention that Doms did not hold title to the entire parcel are without merit." Anderson II 
at [^4 n.3 (emphasis added). Therefore, once again, the trial court and this Court have 
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definitively decided the issue, and the allegation that Doms' statement was "factually 
inaccurate" is simply false. 
5. Plaintiffs also claim that Doms was inaccurate in his Statement of Facts when 
he stated "Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the original buyers of the 
propeity and as a successor-in-interest to McCoy and DomCoy" by claiming that there was 
no evidence presented that Doms was a successor-in-interest to Mr. McCoy. Plaintiffs' 
statement is in itself false, as the statement made by Doms which is challenged by Plaintiffs 
is a direct quote from this Court. Anderson II at [^21 n. 12. Again, that issue has been 
definitively decided by both the trial court and this Court; and the challenged statement made 
by Doms in the Statement of Facts is entirely accurate. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since none of the Statement of Facts in Doms' Opening Brief other than those 
previously addressed was challenged by Plaintiffs in their Responsive Brief, it may be 
presumed that they have no objection to the remainder of the Statement of Facts. Plaintiffs 
do however, attempt to add additional facts which are completely irrelevant and immaterial 
to this Court's determination of the present appeal. These additional facts relate to Plaintiffs' 
challenge of the earlier Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court and/or this 
Court's opinion in Anderson II. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BARS MOST OF PLAINTIFFS' 
ARGUMENTS, AND ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT, 
The law of the case doctrine outright prohibits most of Plaintiffs' arguments. As the 
Utah Supreme Court held in Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543, 
"Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this court on appeal bind the trial 
court on remand and generally bind this court should the case return on appeal after remand." 
Id. at %9. This doctrine is intended to promote "the obedience of inferior courts" and "to 
avoid the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsideration of 
rulings on matters previously decided in the same case." Id. 
Only under three "exceptional circumstances," where the intentions underlying the 
doctrine are outweighed by "the greater interest in preventing unjust results or unwise 
precedent," will the law of the case doctrine be abandoned: 
(1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling authority; 
(2) when new evidence has become available; or 
(3) when the court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. 
Id (relying on Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995)). 
In their Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Plaintiffs argue (1) that Doms is not 
entitled to the return of interest paid under the Trust Deed Note; (2) that rescission is 
inappropriate; (3) that even if rescission was appropriate, the trial court should have 
determined the rights and responsibilities of each individual plaintiff; (4) that they should 
have been awarded rent; (5) that the trial court should not have refunded taxes; and (6) that 
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the trial court should not have awarded prejudgment mteiest With the exception only of (4) 
and (6), all of these arguments are barred by the law of the case doctrine because they have 
already been adjudicated by this Court, and Plaintiffs have not claimed that an "exceptional 
cucumstance" applies to this case Nevertheless, as the following discussion indicates, none 
of Plaintiffs' six aiguments has any merit 
(1) Plaintiffs cannot argue that Doms is not entitled to the return of interest 
paid under the Trust Deed Note; even so, Doms is entitled to the return of 
this interest. 
This Court has already ordered the letum of mteiest paid undei the Trust Deed Note, 
and theiefoie it is the law of the case In his Opening Brief, Doms made the specific point 
that the trial court erred by failing to implement the final decision of this Court dated June 
24, 1999 in this case Doms argued that this Court specifically stated m Anderson II at ^ [21 
(Add 1), "We therefore remand this issue to the trial court foi a determination and award to 
Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest " Doms pointed out that 
the tiial court refused to award him some $72,520 00 in payments made on the contract plus 
mteiest as oidered by this Court 
In response, Plaintiffs ignore the law of the case and argue that the tiial court was 
correct to rule that Doms is not entitled to the letura of interest paid undei the Trust Deed 
Note because the interest was paid for Doms' and McCoy's use of Plaintiffs' money While 
admitting that no Utah case has directly addressed this aspect of the issue, Plaintiffs cite 
Libassi v Chelli, 615 N Y S 2d 75, 76 (N Y App Div 1994), wheie theie was a leversal 
of an awaid of interest to the buyeis in a case involving lescission However, Plaintiffs fail 
to tell this Court that m Libassi, the buyers had fiaudulently induced the selleis to sell the 
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pioperty It was the sellers who later sought lescission, and the court declined to award 
mteiest to the buyers because the buyers didn't have clean hands Plaintiffs' Brief ignores 
the fact that in that case it was the buyer who acted in bad faith In the instant case, it is the 
buyei Poms who seeks rescission and there is no Finding of Fact 01 Conclusion of Law by 
the lower court, and certainly none in the 1999 opinion of this Court, that suggests that Poms 
was responsible foi fiaud 01 had unclean hands Therefoie, the Lihassi case is clearly not 
on point and should have no impact on this Court's previous holding that Poms should 
teceive all cnet payments paid by him less lental value plus interest " 
(a) Plaintiffs' argument fheie and latei) that interest should be applied as a 
"setoff to fair rental value fails because the tiial court found that no fair lental 
value exists in this case 
Plaintiffs cite Bechard v Bolton, 24 N W 2d 422, 423 (Mich 1946), for the 
pioposition that inteiest should be used to offset rental value Howevei, Plaintiffs neglect 
to tell this Court that the Bechard court specifically found that "inteiest and taxes paid by 
the buyer equaled the reasonable rental value of the property " Id at 423 (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, it awarded rental value only because the buyeis "had the light of possession 
to the pioperty from the date of the contract and have used it to a consideiable extent " Id 
(emphasis added) It follows that the outcome in Bechard would likely have been different 
and interest and taxes awarded upon lescission had the buyeis not used the property at 
all—especially if (as is true in the instant case) the property involved was law ground and 
the only use the buyei had for the pioperty had been blocked by the title defect 
In the instant case the trial court found that the pioperty had no rental value As it 
mled in Finding of Fact No 5 of its "Modified Judgment" (attached as Add 4) 
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The Court of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair 
rental value; however the Court finds that the record is completely devoid of 
any basis for rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in 
any way by Defendant Poms. Therefore the Court declines to reduce the 
Judgment in this case by any rental value, finding there is no fair rental value 
to be placed upon the property. 
(R. 8951 (emphasis added).) While Plaintiffs' attempt to convince this Court in Point IV of 
their Responsive Brief that the trial court committed error when it refused to aweird Plaintiffs 
a fair rental value, no citation to the record whatsoever is made to suggest that any evidence 
was ever presented in the original trial or in the hearing on remand suggesting that Doms 
made any use of the property whatsoever so as to trigger some finding that a fair rental value 
was appropriate. Furthermore, as the trial court found, the evidence in this case was replete 
with the idea that Doms had never used the property at all, because he learned that the 
encroachments and easements were valid and had been perfected on the property, thus 
preventing development. See Second Amended Findings of Fact nos. 26-30 and Conclusions 
of Law 2-5 and 11-19 (Add. 2). Therefore, the Bechard case simply does not apply, as the 
failure to award interest was based upon a setoff against fair rental value in that case. 
Plaintiffs also cite Larsen v. Poller, 571 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), as a 
case where an appellate court upheld a lower court's decision to allow sellers to keep all 
prior mortgage payments as fair rental value. In that case, as in Bechard, the buyer had 
initiated repairs on the property at the time of rescission and therefore was found to have 
been occupying and using the property, unlike the situation in the instant case where the 
property lay completely dormant. As the Court stated in Larsen, cTn our view, given 
plaintiffs initiation of needed repairs to the property, County Court properly exercised its 
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equitable powers to effectuate that result [i.e. the intended result of rescission, which is to 
put the parties back in the same position as before] by rescinding the note and mortgage but 
allowing defendants to keep all prior mortgage payments as fair market rental value, and 
denying plaintiffs claims for surveyor's and counsel fees." Id. at 123. It should be noted 
that the Court was not, in this statement, looking at any value the repairs might have added 
to the property; otherwise the Court would have awarded something to the buyers. Instead, 
what seems to be important about the "initiation of needed repairs" is that it showed that the 
property was being used by the buyers; thus, the Court awarded fair rental value to 
defendants and refused plaintiffs request for other costs and fees. 
Finally, Plaintiffs cite Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A. 1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914), 
for the proposition that money received as interest paid on the balance of the purchase price 
should not be returned in a rescission action. Besides the fact that this is a Pennsylvania 
decision from 1914, Plaintiffs seem not to have read the case carefully, since it affirmed the 
trial court's denial of a deduction "for the [buyer's] use of the propeity." The court there 
found "no evidence was offered to show what such use would have been worth." Id. at 1134. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs have never offered evidence to show what the use of the Rossie 
Hills property would have been worth; indeed, Doms has offered evidence to show that he 
did not use the property at all as he was unable to develop it as planned. The propeity 
remains raw ground at the present time and has never had so much as a shovel full of dirt 
moved upon it. 
(b) The law of the case is that Doms is entitled to all sums paid to Plaintiffs on the 
contract. 
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On pages 19-21 of their Responsive Brief, Plaintiffs continue to "beat the dead horse" 
that Doms is only entitled to one-half of the sums paid to Plaintiffs. As indicated previously, 
this Court has clearly laid that issue to rest; it is the law of the case and ought not to be 
disturbed. See Anderson II, at [^21 (awarding "to Doms" net payments, etc.). 
Plaintiffs also seem to argue another issue which has previously been put to rest by 
this Court: that this case involved multiple contracts because there was a separate financing 
document, the Trust Deed Note, along with the WaiTanty Deed. This particular argument 
is clearly a red herring as this Court ruled in Anderson II: 
Although Doms failed to make payments required by the Trust Deed Note, 
he was excused from doing so as a result of Plaintiffs' breach of the 
covenant against encumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 
883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)("The law is well settled that a 
material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by 
the non-breaching party."); ... Bergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123,1125 
(Utah 1984)("if it plainly appears that a seller has lost or encumbered his 
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill his contract, he cannot insist 
that a buyer continue to make payments.") Any prejudice that resulted from 
Doms' failure to make payments pursuant to the Trust Deed Note was 
precipitated by Plaintiffs' breach of warranty. 
Anderson II at ^ [17. 
Therefore, this Court has clearly held, and it is now the law of the case, that Plaintiffs' 
breach of the statutory warranty against encumbrances was a material breach and excused 
Doms from further performance. Thus, the efforts of Plaintiffs to talk about a distinction 
between "multiple contracts" and a "single transaction contract" is a distinction without a 
difference and has no materiality or relevance to the issues before the Court. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court was not required to award the interest paid as 
part of the original contract as claimed by Doms because "a trial court retains some 
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discretion in implementing an appellate court decision," citing Gildea v. Guardian Title 
Company, 2001 UT 75, \% 31 P.3d 543. Plaintiffs' Brief misinterprets Gildea. Gildea 
actually holds that the law of the case doctrine "generally bind[s] the trial court on remand" 
and that it should be abandoned only under the "exceptional circumstances'5 discussed above 
(i.e. change of controlling authority, availability of new evidence, or clear error causing 
manifest injustice). See id. at \9. 
Plaintiffs have identified none of these three "exceptional circumstances" as being 
present in this case. Plaintiffs have not identified an intervening change of controlling 
authority; they did not attempt to introduce new evidence in the trial court after this Court's 
decision m Anderson II; and they do not now argue that this Court's decision remanding the 
case was "clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." See id. Therefore the 
exceptions under Gildea cannot apply and the law of the case doctrine must be enforced. 
(2) The law of the case doctrine bars Plaintiffs' attempt to retry the rescission 
issue; in any event, rescission is appropriate because the parties can be 
returned to the status quo. 
As part of their Cross-Appeal, Plaintiffs again argue, without citing an "exceptional 
circumstance," that the law of the case doctrine ought not to apply and that this Court may 
have carved out some sort of exception to that doctrine when it stated in Anderson II: "In 
fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission the rule is equitable, and requires practicality 
in adjusting the rights of the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether it 
can, is a matter which is in the discretion of the trial court . . . " Anderson II at [^20. 
Plaintiffs claim that the trial court should not have ordered rescission because the parties 
could not be returned to the positions they occupied before the contract. In their Point II, 
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Plaintiffs seem to argue that this Court was wrong when it initially ordered the trial court to 
reconsider rescission as a remedy in Anderson v. Doms Memorandum Decision (Not For 
Publication) 920653-CA, filed November 4,1994 (hereinafter cited as Anderson I) (See Add. 
3) and wrong when it upheld that decision in Anderson II. Once again, the lav/ of the case 
doctrine bars Plaintiffs' argument. There is absolutely no reason for this Court, after now 
some twenty years and three separate appeals in this case, to change its mind and decide that 
rescission is not an appropriate remedy. In any event, Plaintiffs' argument is without merit, 
as the discussion below demonstrates. 
(a) The encroachments on the property matured before Poms' occupancy; thus no 
encroachment affects the parties' ability to be returned to the status quo. 
Plaintiffs' begin their argument against rescission by declaring that the parties cannot 
be returned to the status quo because encroachments on the property have matured during 
Doms' occupancy and cannot now be challenged. This is clearly and absolutely an untrue 
statement. Doms would like to believe that the problem herein relates to the change of 
counsel in this case. Counsel writing the Plaintiffs' Appellate Brief, Larry A. Kirkham, 
having come on board in this third appeal after an almost nineteen year case history, was 
apparently not aware of the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
relating to the encumbrance issue when he made his arguments on page 26 of his Responsive 
Brief and Brief on Cross-Appeal. In its Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (attached as Add. 2) the trial court made findings that have never been challenged by 
either side or disturbed on appeal. The Second Amended Findings of Fact state as follows: 
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the time Doms and McCoy 
purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way extending in a 
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northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-way south of block 59 as 
shown in defendants' Exhibit 77D. 
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, continuously, and 
adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario Avenue and whose rear 
property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie Hills Property, for a period 
in excess of 40 years as of the date of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery 
of the Warranty Deed by grantors to defendant Doms. Such use was for 
ingress and egress to the rear of their property, and for parking. 
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in block 58 are 
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by 
adjoining property owners to the west. (See defendant's Exhibit 77D.) 
13. These encroachments, including the backyard areas bordered by said 
fences, had been used openly, notoriously, continuously and adversely for 
a period in excess of 20 years as of March 23, 1982 by the aforementioned 
property owners, and such use continues through present time. 
(R. 6878, 6879 )(emphases added).) These Findings of Fact resulted in Second Amended 
Conclusions of Law 1-5. (R. 6889, 6890.) 
Therefore, it is certainly misleading and clearly a misstatement of the lower court's 
findings for Plaintiffs to argue that the "encroachments on the property have matured during 
Doms' occupancy." This is simply not true and no evidence for this assertion was ever 
presented to the lower court in any proceeding. 
(b) The ability of the parties to be returned to the status quo is unaffected by the 
death of one of Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs also claim that they cannot be returned to the status quo because one of the 
Plaintiffs died and the estate has been settled. That specific argument was made to this Court 
during the briefing of the first Doms appeal which resulted in this Court's Memorandum 
Decision (Not For Publication) in Anderswn /(Add. 3). Plaintiffs' argument was that a claim 
against Plaintiff D.C. Anderson was barred by Utah's nonclaims statute. Defendant Doms 
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responded by arguing that his causes of action against the Estate of D.C. Anderson are not 
"claims" under the Uniform Probate Code, and therefore need not have been filed against the 
Estate pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-3-801 and § 75-3-803. Doms cited the case of In re: Estate 
of Sharp, 537 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1975), in which the Utah Supreme Court held that an 
equitable action against an estate is not a claim within the meaning of the above statutes and 
that a "claim . . . refers to debts or demands against the decedent which might have been 
enforced in his lifetime, by personal actions for the recoveiy of money; and upon which only 
a money judgment could have been rendered." 537 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).1 
In Anderson I this Court did not rule specifically on this issue but did hold as follows: 
"We agree with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his Counterclaim 
and find Appellants' arguments to be without merit. Thus, we decline to address them." See 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989)(court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal); Anderson I &t2 (Add. 3). Later, the court went on to say, "Because 
it is possible that the trial court will order the contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in 
the record concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims raised. . . ." Id at 3 
n.2. 
1
 Defendant Doms also cited the following cases in accord with this opinion by the 
Utah Supreme Court: Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 77 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of 
Malliet, 649 P.2d 18 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 (Utah 1986); 
Forsyth v. Pendleton, 617 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah 1980). See also Reed v. Sixth Judicial 
District Court, 341 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1959); Wright v. Universal Tire, Inc., 577 S.W.2d 194 
(Tenn. App. 1978), cert, denied 1979; Bank of California v. Connolly, 111 Cal. Rptr. 468 
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1974). 
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Thus, once again, the law of the case doctrine should prevent this Court from needing 
to revisit the non-claims issue. Plaintiffs' argument simply cannot stand in the way of 
rescission in this matter. Even if this Court should find that it does, the argument prevents 
rescission only as to one of the four Plaintiffs; certainly the death of one of the Plaintiffs 
should not allow the other Plaintiffs to escape rescission in this matter. 
(c) The ability of the parties to be returned to the status quo is unaffected by 
McCoy's ''subsequent transfer" to Doms. 
Plaintiffs again continue to "beat the dead horse" in their argument that the parties 
cannot be returned to the status quo by claiming that subsequent transfers of the Rossie Hills 
propeity after its purchase by Doms and McCoy foreclose rescission. While admitting that 
"the Court of Appeals resolved the issue of ownership by simply stating that Doms is the 
owner of the propeity and the successor to DomCoy," they again present the argument that 
Doms received originally only a one-half interest in the propeity. Again however, they 
completely ignore the doctrine of the law of the case on this point and refuse to accept the 
proposition that this matter has been settled after 20 years of litigation and two prior appeals. 
They give no reasons whatsoever as to why Doms, as record owner of the propeity, cannot 
tender back to Plaintiffs the entire property. Therefore this argument must be dismissed 
summarily by this Court. 
In arguing that the law of the case doctrine ought not to apply in this case, and urging 
this Court to reverse its previous decisions and orders, Plaintiffs cite the case of 50 West 
Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency^ 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989). However, 
Plaintiffs miscite this decision. 50 West Broadway does not hold, as Plaintiffs argue, that 
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cc[t]he ability to return the parties to the pre-contract status quo is a prerequisite for rescission 
. . . . " (PL Br. at 24.) The case actually holds that "if the parties cannot be put back in status 
quo, a contract can be rescinded only where the clearest and strongest reason and equity 
imperatively demand it." 784 P.2d at 1170-71 (quoting 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 514, at 
998 (1964)). In other words, even if the parties cannot be put back to the pre-contract status 
quo, the contract can still be rescinded if there is a clear and strong reason for it. Plaintiffs' 
Brief completely misstates this proposition. 
More important, 50 West Broadway dealt with a case in which it was "clear beyond 
peradventure that the parties cannot be returned to the status quo ante" (and therefore the 
court found that damages were an appropriate remedy). Id. at 1171. But here it is "clear 
beyond peradventure" that the parties can be returned to the status quo ante. As Plaintiffs 
correctly admit, 50 West Broadway involved a landowner seeking rescission "after 
subsequent reconveyances and development of the property." Id. at 1163-70. The raw 
ground of the Rossie Hills Property has never been occupied by Doms, let alone developed. 
Putting the parties back to their respective positions before the contract would not adversely 
impact either side. And further, this Court should keep in mind when considering the 
situation that it was Plaintiffs' actions, not Doms', that created the problem in the first place. 
If the encumbrance had been disclosed by Plaintiffs, this lawsuit would not have resulted. 
(3) The law of the case is that it is irrelevant whether Doms or his partner 
made the payments, and that all four Plaintiffs are responsible for 
repayment. 
Plaintiffs argue that even if the order of rescission was appropriate, the trial court 
erred when it refused to determine the rights and responsibilities of the individual parties. 
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Once again, Plaintiffs continue to argue that the amount Doms personally paid for the 
property is all that should be refunded to him; and, they argue, an issue exists as to whether 
Plaintiffs could refund the amounts ordered in equal shares. Plaintiffs argue that Doms is 
entitled at the most to a fraction of the earnest money, down payment and taxes, again 
despite the clear ruling of this Court. 
It has consistently been the position of Defendant Doms that it does not matter 
whether he or his partner or the corporation the two of them formed for a period of time paid 
the monies in question to Plaintiffs, and this Court has accepted that position. Likewise, it 
simply does not matter which of the Plaintiffs received the monies paid by Defendant Doms 
(and/or McCoy and/or DomCoy, Inc.) and it should not be Defendant Doms' requirement 
that he find a way to present evidence to the Court as to which of the four Plaintiffs received 
which portion of the monies. All four Plaintiffs should be jointly and severally liable, and 
this was the ruling of the lower court when it held in its Modified Judgment in this case 
"Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property subject to his 
receiving the following sums . . . ." (R. 8950.) 
Thus, the court clearly indicated that Defendant Doms should return the property to 
all four Plaintiffs who had been the original grantors in the case, and was to receive the 
return of monies ordered by the court from all four Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs should be 
jointly and severally liable to return said monies to Defendant Doms as indicated by the trial 
court. This the court implicitly ruled by not addressing the arguments made by Plaintiffs that 
the Court should decide which Plaintiff should pay which sums to Doms. Since all four 
Plaintiffs jointly owned and conveyed the property, and all four will receive it back, there 
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can be no reason why they should not all four be jointly and severally liable to Doms for 
amounts awarded by the Court in rescission of the contract. 
(4) Plaintiffs are procedurally barred from challenging the (rial court's 
refusal to award rent; nonetheless, there is no basis for awarding rent. 
Plaintiffs' Point IV is that the trial court committed error when it refused to award 
them rent. They argue that the trial court's reasoning that the property was "raw ground," 
which was not used by Doms and therefore had no rental value, ignored statements made by 
this Court in remanding the case. Plaintiffs are essentially challenging the trial court's 
factual finding (in Finding of Fact No. 5 of its Modified Judgment) that the property had no 
rental value. (R. 8951, attached as Add. 4.) 
Under Utah law, when the party to an appeal challenges a court's findings, the party 
is obligated "to marshal the evidence supporting the verdict and then show that such evidence 
cannot support the verdict." Water & Energy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, 
^}15, 48 P.3d 888. When the party does not meet its burden to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court must "assume that the evidence adequately supported the findings" and 
disregard the complaining party's assertion. Id. Since Plaintiffs fail to mention that the 
court's finding was based upon the fact that no evidence was ever presented to show any 
rental value—and, further, that the court's findings were supported by Doms' evidence that 
the property was "raw ground" and could not be used—Plaintiffs have not met their burden 
to marshal the evidence. Their assertion that the court erred must therefore be disregarded. 
That notwithstanding, Plaintiffs' arguments do not support the conclusion they urged 
upon the lower court, and now urge upon this Court, because they have not shown that the 
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tiial court's finding of no rental value was against the clear weight of the evidence, and thus 
"cleaily erroneous " See Pennington v Allstate Ins Co, 973 P 2d 932, 937 (Utah 
1998)(noting that "we will not set aside a tiial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous," and explaining standard of cleai error) 
Once again, it should be cleai fiom the recoid that no evidence whatsoevei of a fair 
lental value of the property was presented to the lower court in the remand hearing 
Plaintiffs were unable to refute the aigument that the giound was law giound when it was 
pui chased and lemains in the exact same condition as it was when the contract of sale was 
consummated 20 yeai s ago The mere fact that Defendant Doms pui chased the property tcfoi 
tesidential development" is immaterial and melevant to the issue of lent undei cucumstances 
wheie absolutely no development of any kind occurred This Court simply ordered, "we 
theiefoie remand this issue to the trial court for a determination and award to Doms of the 
net payments paid by him less lental value plus inteiest" Anderson II at fl21 This Court 
did not older that the lower court must find a fan lental value, but simply implied that if 
theie is evidence of rental value presented that the trial court finds persuasive, the court 
should Ieduce the award by the rental value Undei cucumstances wheie absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever was presented to the trial court as to a fan lental value of the property, 
this Court could not possibly have meant that the lower court was lequired to find a lental 
value in the absence of such evidence 
Plaintiffs cite Bel Ion v Malnar, 808 P 2d 1089 (Utah 1991), and Fullmer v Blood, 
546 P 2d 606 (Utah 1976), foi the pioposition that inteiest paid on a contiact can be awarded 
as a setoff to fan lental value Although this piinciple of law is obviously hue, when a court 
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orders such a setoff it is only under circumstances where the amount of interest paid 
approximates the amount that constitutes fair rental value. These cases stand for the 
proposition that a setoff is allowed; they do not state that in a situation where a court has 
found there is no fair rental value to the property in question, a setoff against interest must 
occur anyway. A trial court could never reasonably allow a seller who has breached 
statutory warranties in conveying a parcel of real estate—which the court determines to have 
no rental value—to obtain the windfall of a setoff against interest where rescission is 
ordered. Neither Bellon nor Fullmer is controlling in the instant case. 
The same can be said of the four other cases cited by Plaintiffs in this section.2 (PL 
Br. at 32-33.) A careful review of each of these other cases shows that all of them involved 
a finding of fair rental value that could be canceled by a setoff. Here, in contrast, there was 
a specific finding that there was no fair rental value. Thus, these other cases are equally 
unhelpful to Plaintiffs. 
(5) It is the law of the case that Doms was to receive "net payments paid," 
which necessarily includes taxes. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court should not have refunded taxes paid by Doms. 
Despite the clear holding in Bergs from v. Moore, 677 P. 2d 1123 (Utah 1984), that the parties 
should be restored to their original positions, and the clear holding of this Court that Doms 
should receive "net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest," Plaintiffs argue that 
2
 The four cases are Larsen v. Potter, 571 N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 
1991); Bechardv. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946); Brink v. Larsen, 411 
N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); and Ohio Valley Trust Co. v. Allison, 89 A. 
1132, 1134 (Pa. 1914). 
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taxes "are not necessarily refundable." (PI. Br. at 35.) Plaintiffs once again cite the case of 
Libassi v. Chelli, 615 N.Y.S.2d 75, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), for this proposition. As 
explained above, the Libassi court refused to award interest and taxes because the buyers in 
that case had committed fraud; furthermore, the sellers in Libassi were not at fault at all. 
Here, the sellers were at fault, and Doms had clean hands. 
Plaintiffs also cite once again Bechard v. Bolton, 24 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Mich. 1946), 
for this same proposition. As explained above, the court in Bechard was tiying to set off a 
reasonable rental value of the property by not awarding interest and taxes. Here, there was 
no rental value. Neither Libassi nor Bechard has any application to the instant case. 
(6) Plaintiffs are precluded from raising the prejudgment interest issue now 
because they failed to raise it in the lower court; even so, prejudgment 
interest is required under these circumstances. 
Finally, Plaintiffs raise the prejudgment interest issue. Plaintiffs correctly point out 
that "Doms cited no case which would justify an award of prejudgment interest." (PI. Br. 
at 37.) However, Plaintiffs never raised the issue of prejudgment interest in the court below. 
They argued that Doms should not receive the interest payments on the contract but never 
once raised the issue of prejudgment interest regarding any amounts ordered by the Court to 
be returned to Doms. Plaintiffs are precluded from raising the issue now. It is black-letter 
law that "to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the 
trial court." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)(citing DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 835 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1997), and declining to hear plaintiffs' argument 
on appeal because it was not "adequately raised" below"). In other words, 
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a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue. A trial court 
has the opportunity to rule if the following three requirements are met: (1) the 
issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically 
raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. The purpose of such requirements is to put the judge on notice of 
the asserted error and allow the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
course of the proceeding. 
Id. (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). Furthennore, Plaintiffs have not 
cited to the record showing that this issue was preserved in the trial court or, if they admit 
it was not preserved, stated any grounds for seeking review of it now—as required by Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5). 
In any event, Plaintiffs claim that "[prejudgment interest is not awarded in equity 
cases such as this" and cite BeUon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). as authority for 
this veiy broad proposition. (PL Br. at 36.) Their claim is wrong, and Bellon neither stands 
for that proposition nor impairs Doms' claim for prejudgment interest. 
More recently than Bellon and without overruling it, the Utah Supreme Court has said 
that cc[t]he law on this issue is clear," and has explained as follows: 
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time ... and not from the date of judgment. On the 
other hand, where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, 
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damages 
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of fact at the trial, and in such 
cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995)(quoting Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989))(grammatical alternations omitted). The Cornia 
court refused to allow prejudgment interest not because of the type of claim that was present, 
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but because u[w]ithout any clear factual information, plaintiffs' damages could not be 
measured by facts and figures or calculated with mathematical accuracy." Cornia, 898 P.2d 
at 1387 (internal quotations omitted). 
Bell on involved a damages calculation that could not be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy because the trial court was required to exercise its "conscience and discretion" in 
determining the correct market value of the disputed property at the time of default. Bellon, 
808 P.2d at 1097. In contrast, Doms5 claim for prejudgment interest did not require the 
"conscience and discretion" of the trial court; all that was required was proof of Doms' 
payments, the dates of those payments, and a calculator. Using these simple and accurate 
instruments, the trial court in its Modified Judgment easily ascertained the principal amount 
at issue—as well as the amount of prejudgment interest—with mathematical accuracy.3 
Thus, the fact that rescission is an equitable remedy is irrelevant. The determinative 
factor is whether the damages can be assessed with mathematical accuracy, the underlying 
concern being, as this Court has pointed out since Bellon (and in an attempt to explain it), 
a desire to protect against "a risk of double recovery." Shoreline DeveL, Inc. v. Utah County, 
3
 The relevant portion of the Modified Judgment reads as follows: 
"3. Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property 
subject to his receiving the following sums: 
a. $10,000.00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which shall 
be the sum of $28,731.51 through August 1, 2000 and $2.74 per day thereafter; 
b. The sum of $72,500.00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest 
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86 per day 
thereafter; 
c. All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interest from the date the 
payment was made which shall be the sum of $23,070.73 through August 1, 2000 and 
$4.26 per day thereafter." 
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835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). There is an overriding (but in cases before 
Shoreline, unspoken) presumption that the judgment in an equity case already includes 
interest and that adding prejudgment interest to that judgment could cause a double recovery. 
Even this Court in Anderson II exhibited an awareness of this presumption when it instructed 
the trial court on remand to "fashion an adequate and reasonable remedy ... so long as that 
remedy is not duplicative." Anderson / /at [^20. Here, where the damages can be (and were) 
assessed with perfect mathematical accuracy and where such damages do not already include 
interest, there is no risk that "prejudgment interest may be added to a jury's equity award by 
the trial court who does not know whether the jury's award covers interest" (Shoreline, 835 
P.2d at 211), and prejudgment interest is appropriate. Prejudgment interest is, in fact, 
specifically allowed because "where justice and equity require, interest may be awarded as 
part of the damages." Id. (citing Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885, 
887 (Utah 1976)). 
Finally, Plaintiffs cite BLTInvestment Co. v. Snow, 586 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978) for the 
proposition that Doms should not be allowed prejudgment interest. The exact holding in 
BLT Investment was that a party "may not avoid the contract and, at the same time, claim the 
benefit" of a provision in that contract. Id. at 458. But Doms does not "claim the benefit" 
of any interest provision in the contract for the Rossie Hills property. To the contrary, Doms 
only argues that Plaintiffs should not be allowed to keep a benefit of a contract (the interest 
paid by buyers) that is being rescinded. As the court in BLT Investment itself said, "The 
authorities generally hold that rescission extinguishes the contract so effectually that it never 
had any existence." Id. Yet if Plaintiffs are allowed to have used the benefit of several 
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hundred thousand dollars of Doms' money over a period in excess of twenty years without 
being required to pay any interest on such use, the contract could hardly be said to have 
never existed. Since a determination can be made with mathematical certainty as to the 
damages to Defendant Doms and since there is no risk of double recovery, Defendant Doms 
is entitled to prejudgment interest under U.C.A. § 15-1-1. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Plaintiffs are simply trying to relitigate issues that have already been 
decided by this Court and which constitute the law of the case. Plaintiffs have given this 
Court no "exceptional circumstance" on which to justify relitigating these issues; therefore 
they are precluded from raising these issues. In any event, the arguments made by Plaintiffs 
concerning these issues are without merit. 
To the extent Plaintiffs ask this Court to find error in the trial court's refusal to grant 
a setoff for fair rental value, they are asking this Court to overrule a factual finding of the 
trial court. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the trial court committed clear error in 
finding that there was no rental value to the property. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' attempt to raise the issue of prejudgment interest is barred 
procedurally and unsound on its merits. It would be a gross inequity not to award Doms 
prejudgment interest, and would effectively nullify this Court's own earlier ruling that 
rescission is appropriate. 
This Court is asked to finally end over seventeen years of litigation (the litigation 
began approximately three years after the contract between the parties was consummated) 
by reversing the trial court's Judgment where it refused to award Doms the $72,520.00 in 
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interest payments plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the appropriate legal rates, 
and affirming all other aspects of the Court's Modified Judgment in this case. This Court 
is asked to reject the erroneous arguments of Plaintiffs and conclude this litigation once and 
for all. 
DATED this _A_ day of 4 - ^ ^ 2002. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
by first class U.S. postage prepaid, this lu^Vvday of ^c**V- , 2002, to: 
Larry A. Kirkham 
Attorney at Law 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
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gious to permit the imposition of the death 
penalty. See State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1248 (Utah 1993) ("we can confidently 
say beyond a reasonable doubt that even if 
the jury had not considered the invalid ag-
gravator, it would have returned a verdict of 
death"), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 
476, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993). The trial court 
found overwhelming aggravating evidence 
and rejected all of Lovell's mitigation theo-
ries. As in Archuleta, leaving out the "per-
sonal gain" aggravator would not have re-
duced Lovell's sentence, so any error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
[14] 11 46 Lovell claims that his trial coun-
sel performed ineffectively because he did 
not raise the constitutional challenges to the 
specific aggravating circumstances that Lo-
vell raises on appeal. In order to prove his 
claim, Lovell must identify specific acts or 
omissions by counsel which fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, over-
coming the presumption that counsel ren-
dered constitutionally adequate assistance. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-S8, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 
(1984). Furthermore, under Strickland, Lo-
vell must also affirmatively prove that the 
challenged acts or omissions undermine con-
fidence in the outcome of his trial. See Id. at 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As we have discussed, 
Lovell's counsel had no basis on which to 
challenge the constitutionality of the death 
penalty statute, including the specific aggra-
vators. The constitutionality of the statute 
has been upheld by this Court, so counsel 
had no reason to believe he could make a 
legitimate constitutional challenge. As we 
have noted, the trial court could and did 
consider all the evidence in the case under 
the general sentencing provision, without re-
lying explicitly on the specific aggi'avators as 
aggravators challenged by Lovell. Lovell 
fails to establish that his counsel's failure to 
challenge the statutory provisions fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Therefore, Lovell's claim does not overcome 
the strong presumption that counsel per-
formed adequately; Lovell's constitutional 
claims must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
1147 Because we find that all of Lovell's 
claims fail, we affirm his conviction and sen-
tence of death. 
Chief Justice HOWE, Justice STEWART, 
Justice ZIMMERMAN, and Justice 
RUSSON concur in Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM'S opinion. 
JH\ . 
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Ellen ANDERSON, as personal represen-
tative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Dan Scott; Ellen Anderson, personally; 
and Jeanne Scott, Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross appellants, 
v. 
Eugene E. DOMS and Michael R. McCoy, 
Defendants, Appellant, and Cross 
appellee. 
No. 971762-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 24, 1999. 
Vendors brought suit for foreclosure 
based on default on trust deed note given to 
secure balance owed on purchase price. Pur-
chaser counterclaimed for rescission or dam-
ages for breach of implied covenants, breach 
of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation. 
Following bench trial, the District Court de-
nied request for rescission based upon laches 
and awarded purchaser monetary damages 
as result of encumbrances on property. The 
Court of Appeals remanded for additional 
findings on laches. On remand, the District 
Court again held that laches barred rescis-
sion and awarded attorney fees and costs. 
Both sides appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that: (1) vendors did not 
suffer requisite prejudice
 tto support laches 
bar to rescission claim; (2) rescission was 
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appropriate remedy for vendors' breach of 
covenant; (3) there was no statutory or con-
tractual basis to support award of fees and 
costs to purchaser; and (4) vendors were 
entitled to fees incurred in securing default 
judgment on foreclosure claim that was sub-
sequently vacated. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., dissented. 
1. Appeal and Error <£=> 1008.1(8.1) 
Although the determination of whether a 
party was prejudiced for purposes of the 
doctrine of laches is a legal conclusion that is 
reviewed for correctness, trial court's find-
ings of fact underlying that conclusion will 
not be set aside unless they are clearly erro-
neous. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(1) 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is 
a question of law which is reviewed for cor-
rectness. 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>1024.1 
The sufficiency of a trial court's findings 
supporting an award of attorney fees is re-
viewed under a correction-of-error standard. 
4. Appeal and Error <3=757(3) 
Appellant was relieved of his burden to 
marshal evidence by reason of inadequacy of 
trial court's findings, which were unsupport-
ed in record or did not support ultimate 
conclusion on issue of laches. 
5. Vendor and Purchaser <^ =»119 
Purchaser's failure to pay taxes on prop-
erty and resulting tax sale did not prejudice 
vendors, so as to support laches bar based on 
purchaser's delay in seeking rescission of 
real estate contract, where tax sale was ulti-
mately declared void and purchaser paid tax-
es and regained title to property. 
6. Vendor and Purchaser ^ l ^ 
Delay in seeking rescission of real estate 
contract did not prejudice vendors through 
loss of witnesses or evidence, so as to raise 
laches bar to rescission claim, despite death 
of one vendor in interim, absent proof that 
vendors were deprived, to their prejudice, of 
any specific evidence or testimony. 
7. Vendor and Purchaser (S=>119 
Loss in value of property did not by 
itself show that vendors were prejudiced by 
purchaser's delay in bringing rescission ac-
tion, so as to raise laches bar to rescission 
claim. 
8. Equity <3=>72(4) 
Increase or decrease in the value of 
property alone does not satisfy the prejudice 
prong of the laches defense. 
9. Vendor and Purchaser <3=>119 
Trial court's finding that it would be 
inequitable to allow purchaser to rescind con-
tract because he would benefit from his poor 
decisions, was moral judgment, not fact find-
ing, and did not support conclusion that ven-
dors were prejudiced by purchaser's delay in 
seeking rescission of contract and that rescis-
sion was accordingly barred by laches. 
10. Vendor and Purchaser G ^ l ^ 
Purchaser's failure to make payments 
under trustee deed note did not show that 
vendors were prejudiced by purchaser's fail-
ure to perform, so as to impose laches bar-
based on purchaser's delay in bringing re-
scission action, where any prejudice was pre-
cipitated by vendors' breach of covenant 
against encumbrances. 
11. Vendor and Purchaser <®=>119 
Absent proof that vendors were preju-
diced by purchaser's several year delay in 
bringing action to rescind real estate pur-
chase contract, laches did not bar relief. 
12. Vendor and Purchaser <S=*110 
Rescission of contract was proper reme-
dy for vendor's breach of covenant against 
encumbrances. 
13. Vendor and Purchaser <s=*126 
Upon rescission of contract for vendor's 
breach of warranty in case in which purchas-
er made no significant improvements or 
changes to real property, purchaser was enti-
tled to return of net payments made on trust 
deed note less rental value of property plus 
interest. 
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14. Costs €=>194.16 
Attorney fees are recoverable only if 
there is a statutory or contractual basis for 
awarding such fees. 
15. Covenants <s=> 132(2) 
Purchaser who was successful in obtain-
ing rescission of real estate contract based on 
breach of covenant against encumbrances 
was not entitled to award of fees, as there 
was no statute or contractual provision justi-
fying award for rescission remedy and pur-
chaser did not incur attorney fees in any 
attempt to remove encumbrances. 
16. Mortgages <3=>5S0, 581(3) 
Vendors were entitled to attorney fees 
and costs incurred in securing default judg-
ment in foreclosure action against purchaser 
under trust deed note, but not to other fees 
incurred in litigation after default judgment 
was vacated, as purchaser ultimately pre-
vailed. 
Larry R. Keller, Keller & Lundgren Lc, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nessett, 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellees. 
Before GREENWOOD, Associate P.J., and 
BENCH and DAVIS, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
111 Defendant Eugene E. Doms appeals 
for the second time the trial court's denial of 
his request to rescind a real estate contract. 
Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson and Dan and 
Jeanne Scott cross-appeal, arguing, among 
other things, that the doctrine of laches bars 
recission of the contract1 Both parties ap-
peal the trial court's award of attorney fees 
and costs. We reverse and remand. 
1. Because the resolution of whether laches bars 
rescission in this case is dispositive, we do not 
address plaintiffs' alternative arguments 
2. Before purchasing the property, Doms wa*. 
aware of the existence of several roads and sheds 
BACKGROUND 
112 In March 1982, plaintiffs Dan and 
Jeanne Scott, Ellen Anderson, and D.C. 
Anderson, Ellen Anderson's now deceased 
husband, sold a parcel of property known as 
Rossi Hills (the property) in Park City, Utah, 
to Doms and Michael R. McCoy for residen-
tial development. In connection with this 
sale, plaintiffs executed a Warranty Deed 
that included a covenant against encum-
brances. Doms and McCoy executed a Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note to secure pay-
ment of the balance owed on the purchase 
price of $194,250. Doms and McCoy also 
acquired an interest in a parcel adjoining the 
property known as the "slipper parcel." 
McCoy no longer has any interest in the 
property and is not involved in this appeal. 
113 In late 1984 or early 1985, Doms's 
attorney informed him that several encroach-
ments and easements existed on the proper-. 
ty.2 As a result, Doms did not make the 
scheduled payments on the property and at-
tempted to deed the property back to plain-
tiffs in return for cancellation of the Trust 
Deed Note. Plaintiffs did not respond to this 
offer and, in June 1985, filed a complaint 
seeking to foreclose on the property. Two 
years later, plaintiffs obtained a default judg-
ment against Doms and McCoy because they 
failed to file an answer in response to plain-
tiffs' complaint Nine days after entry of the 
default judgment, Doms filed an answer and 
counterclaim to plaintiffs' complaint. Ap-
proximately four months later, the trial court 
entered an order setting aside the default 
judgment against Doms on the condition that 
Doms pay all attorney fees incurred by plain-
tiffs in obtaining the default judgment 
However, the court reserved a final ruling on 
the award of these fees until final disposition 
of the case on the merits. 
114 In May 1987, the property was sold to 
Summit County in a foreclosure sale for the 
nonpayment of property taxes. At that time, 
title to the property was held by Domcoy, a 
corporation formed by Doms and McCoy, to 
on the pioperty However, according to Doms, 
it was not until approximately two years after the 
purchase of the property that he learned of the 
legal significance of the encumbrances on the 
property. 
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which they had transferred their interest in 
the property. After Doms paid all delin-
quent taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, 
Summit County conveyed the property to 
Domcoy by quitclaim deed. Domcoy then 
conveyed the property to Doms.3 In the 
meantime, plaintiffs had filed another action 
challenging the tax sale and subsequent pur-
chase of the property by Summit County, 
seeking to quiet title to the property in their 
favor. Upon stipulation of Summit County, 
plaintiffs, and Doms, the trial court set aside 
the tax sale. 
11 5 In early 1988, Doms amended his coun-
terclaim, seeking rescission of the contract 
or, in the alternative, damages for breach of 
implied covenants, breach of contract, fraud, 
and misrepresentation. In 1990, the trial 
was bifurcated and a three day trial was held 
on the issue of rescission of the contract. 
Plaintiffs argued, on the basis of laches, that 
Doms was prohibited from rescinding the 
contract because there was an unreasonable 
delay between the time Doms learned of the 
basis for rescission and his attempt to re-
scind the contract. The trial court subse-
quently issued a Memorandum Decision, 
finding that because Doms unreasonably de-
layed seeking rescission, laches barred re-
scission of the contract. 
H 6 The remainder of the trial focused on 
the issue of whether Doms was entitled to 
damages as a result of the encumbrances on 
the property. The trial court also held a 
-hearing on the issue of attorney fees. In its 
Second Amended Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Second Amended Judg-
ment, the trial court, based upon laches, de-
nied Doms's request for rescission and 
awarded Doms $83,000 in damages as a re-
sult of the encumbrances on the property 
and $101.50 in costs. The trial court also 
awarded $41,333.20 in attorney fees and 
costs, plus interest, to plaintiffs. 
U 7 Both parties appealed the trial court's 
decision on several grounds. This court sub-
sequently issued an unpublished Memoran-
dum Decision holding that the trial court 
3. * On remand, the trial court found that the con-
veyance of the property from Summit County to 
•Doms after the tax sale resulted in Doms holding 
dear title to the property " Therefore, plain-
improperly applied the doctrine of laches to 
bar rescission of the contract without first 
entering findings of fact regarding whether 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay in 
seeking rescission. See Anderson v. Doms, 
No. 920653-CA, slip op. at 2-3 (Utah CtApp. 
Nov. 4, 1994) (unpublished mem. decision). 
Consequently, this court remanded the case 
to the trial court for further findings on the 
issue of prejudice, stating, "If the trial court 
cannot find from the evidence presented that 
the [plaintiffs] were prejudiced by the delay, 
the equitable doctrine of laches should not 
bar the remedy of rescission." Id On re-
mand, the trial court again refused to rescind 
the contract, concluding plaintiffs were preju-
diced by Doms's delay in seeking rescission. 
This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] 118 Doms argues he is entitled to 
rescission because the trial court's findings 
on remand do not support its conclusion that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by his delay in 
seeking rescission of the contract. See Bar-
land v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 
1987) ("To successfully assert a laches de-
fense, a [party] must establish both that the 
[other party] unreasonably delayed in bring-
ing an action [to rescind the contract] and 
that the defendant was prejudiced by that 
delay." (citing Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v. 
Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975))). Although the de-
termination of whether a party was preju-
diced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is 
a legal conclusion that we review for correct-
ness, we will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact underlying that conclusion 
unless they are clearly erroneous. See Swee-
ney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 
(Utah 1990). 
[2,3] 11 9 Doms also challenges the trial 
court's award of attorney fees and costs. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a 
question of law which we review for correct-
ness. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 314 (Utah 1998) (citing Robertson v. 
tiffs' arguments premised on the contention that 
Doms did not hold title to the entire parcel are 
without merit. 
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Gem Ins., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah Ct.App. 
1992)). The sufficiency of a trial court's find-
ings supporting an award of attorney fees is 
also reviewed under a eorrection-of-error 
standard. See id. Finally, although trial 
courts are normally afforded broad discretion 
in determining what constitutes a reasonable 
fee, see id., such an award " 'must be based 
on the evidence and supported by findings of 
fact '" Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 
890, 893 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cottonwood 
Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 
1992)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Findings of Fact 
[4] 11 10 In challenging the trial court's 
findings of fact, Doms argues he should be 
relieved of his burden to marshal the evi-
dence because of the inadequacy of the trial 
court's findings. See Woodivard v. Fazzio, 
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct.App.1991) ("There 
is, in effect, no need for an appellant to 
marshal the evidence when the findings are 
so inadequate that they cannot be meaning-
fully challenged as factual determinations."). 
We agree. Because the findings Doms chal-
lenges are either unsupported in the record 
or do not support the conclusion that plain-
tiffs were prejudiced, we agree that Doms is, 
for the most part, relieved of the marshaling 
requirement. We therefore address Doms's 
specific challenges to the trial court's find-
ings of fact. 
A. Finding 10a4 
1111 Finding 10a provides that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced because Doms has an inter-
4. Finding 10a states: 
Doms had the use and benefit of the proper-
ty to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. He pur-
chased the slipper parcel and attempted to 
formulate a plan for a three-parcel integrat-
ed development, but was unsuccessful. The 
plaintiffs are nov foreclosed from develop-
ing an integrated development because 
Doms has an interest in the slipper parcel 
and the likelihood of Domsf's] cooperation 
with the plaintiffs in an integrated develop-
ment is remote. 
5. Finding 10b states: "Doms failed to pay the 
property taxes for the years 1982, 1983, 1984, 
1985 and 1986, which resulted in a tax sale and 
est in the slipper parcel and would likely 
refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs in develop-
ing the adjoining property. However, plain-
tiffs do not dispute that Doms's interest in 
the slipper parcel was extinguished at a tax 
sale. Because this finding is inaccurate an<} 
without record support, it is clearly errone^ 
ous and has no relevance to the issue ,pf 
prejudice. 
B. Finding 10b5 
[5] 11 12 Finding 10b states that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced as a result of Doms's failure 
to pay taxes on the property. However, we 
cannot see how failure to pay property taxes 
prejudiced plaintiffs. Doms ultimately paid 
the taxes and regained title to the property. 
Further, all parties stipulated that the tax 
sale was void and that plaintiffs' trust deed 
was a valid lien on the property. Thus, 
finding 10b does not support the trial court's 
conclusion that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms's delay. 
C. Findings 10c6 and lOd 7 
[6] 11 13 Findings 10c and lOd both state 
that Doms's delay in seeking rescission re-
sulted in the unavailability of witnesses. Al-
though it is true that one party to the origi: 
nal transaction, D.C. Anderson, had died and 
other witnesses may have become unavail-
able or forgotten information relevant to the 
sale of the property, these findings do not 
demonstrate that plaintiffs were deprived of 
any specific evidence or testimony or how 
lack of that evidence would adversely affect 
plaintiffs. Because Findings 10c and lOd are 
conclusory and do not include any informa-
required the plaintiffs to initiate legal action to 
clear the title." 
6. Finding of fact 10c states: "D.C. Anderson, one 
of the principals in the transaction, died while 
Doms was in possession of the property, thus
 t 
making it impossible to elicit testimony from the 
decedent ." 
7. Finding of fact lOd states: "Doms'[s] delay of 
more than six (6) years before he sought to 
rescind the transaction adversely affected the 
plaintiffs' opportunity to resolve the encroach-
ment and easement problems because witnesses 
would be unavailable and memories are dimmed 
by the lapse of t ime." 
ANDERSON v. DOMS 
Che as 984 P 2d 392 (Utah App. 1999) 
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tion about testimony that plaintiffs could not 
elicit as a result of the delay, these findings 
do not support the trial court's conclusion of 
prejudice. 
1114 Finding lOd also states that plaintiffs 
were prejudiced because Doms's delay pre-
vented them from resolving the encroach-
ments on the property. However, plaintiffs 
have not shown how Doms's delay made re-
moving the encroachments any more difficult 
than it would have been before the sale of 
the property or in the event plaintiffs reac-
quire the property. Thus, finding lOd does 
not show that plaintiffs were prejudiced by 
Doms's delay. 
D. Findings 10e8 and 10f9 
[7,8] 1115 Findings lOe and lOf state that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced because the prop-
erty suffered a fifty percent decrease in val-
ue during the time that Doms possessed it. 
The first time this case was appealed, we 
specifically rejected the argument that an 
increase or decrease in the value of property 
alone satisfies the prejudice prong of the 
laches defense. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 
2d 261, 271, 332 P.2d 981, 988 (Utah 1958) 
(stating "natural increment" in value of prop-
erty does not, standing alone, constitute prej-
udice for purposes of laches doctrine); see 
also West Los Angeles Inst for Cancer Re-
search v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Cir.1966) (same). Rather, a change in prop-
erty value is only one factor a court may 
consider in determining prejudice for the 
purpose of laches. See Lawson v. Haynes, 
170 F.2d 741, 744 (10th Cir.1948); Filler v. 
Richland, 247 Mont. 285, 806 P.2d 537, 540 
(1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 
159 (Utah 1976). Therefore, the trial court's 
finding that the property suffered a decrease 
in value does not, in and of itself, show that 
plaintiffs were prejudiced by Doms's delay. 
8- Finding of fact lOe states "During the time 
Dorns, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc and Summit 
County were in possession of the property, the 
property suffered a 50% reduction in its value " 
9- Finding of fact 1 Of states "Domsf's] inexperi-
ence in developing propeity or inability to sell 
the property impacted the plaintiffs greatly be-
cause of down turn in the real estate market and 
the increased costs to develop the property if 
they chose to do so " 
E. Finding lOg1 
[9] 1116 Finding lOg states that it would 
be inequitable to allow Doms to rescind the 
contract because he ushould not benefit from 
his poor decisions." Because this statement 
appears to be nothing more than a moral 
judgment, unsupported by any evidence or 
law, we cannot say that it supports the trial 
court's conclusion that plaintiffs were preju-
diced. 
F. Finding lOh n 
[10] 1117 Finding lOh, actually a legal 
conclusion, states that Doms may not rescind 
the contract because he was in default. We 
disagree. Although Doms failed to make 
payments required by the Trust Deed Note, 
he was excused from doing so as a result of 
plaintiffs' breach of the covenant against en-
cumbrances. See Holbrook v. Master Protec-
tion Corp, 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah CtApp. 
1994) ("The law is well settled that a material 
breach by one party to a contract excuses 
further performance by the nonbreaching 
party.") (citing Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 
796, 806 (Utah Ct.App.1992)); Wright u 
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990); Bergstrovi v. Moore, 677 P.2d 
1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) ("If it plainly appears 
that a seller has lost or encumbered his 
ownership so that he will not be able to fulfill 
his contract, he cannot insist that a buyer 
continue to make payments."). Any preju-
dice that resulted from Doms's failure to 
make payments pursuant to the Trust Deed 
Note was precipitated by plaintiffs' breach of 
warranty. Because plaintiffs may not breach 
the contract and then claim they were preju-
diced by Doms's failure to perform, this find-
ing does not suppoii, the trial court's conclu-
sion that plaintiffs were prejudiced. 
10. Finding of fact lOg states "Doms should not 
benefit from his poor decision at the expense of 
the plaintiffs To allow that to happen would be 
inequitable." 
U. Finding of fact lOh states "Doms was in 
default; therefore, he could not invoke the doc-
trine of rescission " 
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[11] 1118 In our previous Memorandum 
Decision in this case, we stated that "[i]f the 
trial court cannot find from the evidence 
presented that the appellants were preju-
diced by the delay, the equitable doctrine of 
laches should not bar the remedy of rescis-
sion." Anderson v. Doms, No. 920653-CA, 
slip op. at 3 (Utah CtApp. Nov. 4, 1994) 
(unpublished mem. decision). Having con-
cluded the trial court's findings do not show 
that plaintiffs were prejudiced, we next ad-
dress the remedy of rescission. 
II. Rescission 
[12] 1119 The only theory plaintiffs ad-
vance on appeal to bar rescission of the 
contract is laches. This theory fails, howev-
er, because plaintiffs have not shown any 
prejudice. Therefore, Doms is entitled to 
rescind the contract as a remedy for breach 
of warranty. Indeed, this remedy is consis-
tent with Utah case law and that of other 
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Bergstrom v. Moore, 
677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) (granting 
rescission when seller breached covenant 
against encumbrances and stating, '"mere 
knowledge of encumbrances . . would not be 
sufficient to exclude them from the operation 
of the statutory covenant against encum-
brances") (citing Jones v. Grow Inv. & Mort-
gage Co., 11 Utah 2d 326, 358 P.2d 909 
(1961)); Breicer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 
799 P.2d 716, 725 (Utah CtApp.1990) (affirm-
ing rescission of contract where, although 
buyers were aware of encumbrance on prop-
erty before purchase, they did not under-
stand the legal implications of such encum-
brance until five years after purchasing the 
property). 
[13] 1120 On remand, the trial .court 
should determine what is necessary to re-
store the parties to the status quo at the time 
the parties entered into the contract. See 
Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 (affirming re-
scission of contract and placing parties in 
original positions by allowing recovery of 
payments already made under contract). In 
fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescis-
sion, the rule 
is equitable, and requires practicality ip 
adjusting the rights of the parties. How 
this is to be accomplished, or indeed 
whether it can, is a matter which is within 
the discretion of the trial court under the 
facts as found to exist by the trier of fact, 
The trial court therefore has discretion to 
fashion an adequate and reasonable reme-
dy so that an aggrieved party is adequate-
ly compensated for its loss, so long as that 
remedy is not duplicative. 
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 
P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) (citation & empha 
sis omitted). 
11 21 In this case, Doms apparently made 
no improvements or changes to the property 
such that the parties could not be returned to 
their respective positions prior to entering 
into the contract. We therefore remand this 
issue to the trial court for a determination 
and award to Doms of the net payments paid 
by him less rental value plus interest.12 See 
Bergstro?n, 677 P.2d at 1125. 
III. Attorney Fees and Costs 
[14,15] 1122 Both parties appeal from 
the trial court's award of attorney fees and 
costs. Attorney fees are recoverable only if 
there is a statutory or contractual basis for 
awarding such fees. See Foote v. Clark, 962 
P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998) (stating attorney 
fees will be awarded only when contract or 
statute provides basis for award). Although 
Doms requests fees for pursuing his rescis-
sion remedy, he cites no statute or contrac-
tual provision to justify such an award. Fur-
thermore, because Doms has not incurred 
attorney fees to remove the encumbrances 
on the property, he is not entitled to fees 
and costs incurred in conjunction with 
breach of the covenant against encum-
brances. See Forrer v. Sather, 595 P.2d 
1306, 1308-09 (Utah 1979) (holding party 
may recover attorney fees in connection with 
breach of covenant against encumbrance 
only "where the plaintiff purchased or extin-
guished the outstanding incumbrance" but 
not for "fee[s] in an action against the cove-
nantor for breach of the covenant"). We 
12. Doms is entitled to a refund of monies paid as 
one of the original buyers of the property, and as 
the successor in interest to McCoy and Domcoy. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
NEWSPAPER AGENCY v. DEPT. OF WORKFORCE Utah 
Cite as 984 P.2d 399 (UtahApp. 1999) 
therefore do not award any attorney fees to 1127 I DISSENT: RUSSELL 
Doms. BENCH, Judge. 
[16] 1123 Regarding the trial court's 
award of fees and costs to plaintiffs, we 
affirm the trial court's award of fees and 
costs incurred in obtaining the default judg-
ment. See Dixonweb Printing Co. v. Photo 
Intercept Coupon Sys., 94 Civ. 
7436(MBM)(RLE), 1995 WL 384415, at *6, 
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8871, at *15 
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1995) (affirming award of 
attorney fees and costs to plaintiffs in obtain-
ing default judgment "whether or not defen-
dant's conduct is willful"). However, because 
plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, we 
vacate all other awards to plaintiffs. See 
Loosie v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 858 
P.2d 999, 1003 (Utah 1993) (denying request 
for attorney fees because no basis for award 
in connection with quiet title action where 
promissory note and trust deed provided 
only for attorney fees incurred in foreclo-
sure). Thus, we remand to the trial court for 
consideration of plaintiffs' counsel's evidence 
regarding reasonable fees incurred in con-
nection with obtaining the default judgment 
and an appropriate award based on that evi-
dence. 
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CONCLUSION 
11 24 The trial court's findings on remand 
did not adequately show that plaintiffs were 
prejudiced by Doms's delay in seeking rescis-
sion of the contract. Furthermore, rescis-
sion of the contract in this case is consistent 
with Utah case law. Accordingly, the trial 
court should order rescission and determine 
an appropriate remedy in connection with 
rescinding the contract. We affirm the trial 
court's denial of attorney fees to Doms. We 
also affirm the trial court's fee award to 
plaintiffs incurred in connection with obtain-
ing the default judgment but vacate all other 
attorney fee awards to plaintiffs. Both par-
ties shall bear their respective attorney fees 
incurred on appeal. 
U 25 Reversed and remanded. 
H 26 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
NEWSPAPER AGENCY 
CORPORATION, 
Petitioner, 
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE 
SERVICES and Teresa Ortiz, 
Respondents. 
No. 981369-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
July 9, 1999. 
Claimant sought unemployment insur-
ance benefits following separation from em-
ployment. The Department of Workforce 
Services denied benefits, and claimant ap-
pealed. The Workforce Appeals Board re-
versed, granted benefits, and held that em-
ployer was responsible for its share of 
benefit costs. Employer appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Onne, J., held that: (1) 
claimant's appeal was timely filed, and (2) 
employer was not relieved of its assessed 
share of cost of claimant's unemployment 
benefits. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <^S42(1) 
The interpretation of statutes that raise 
questions of law are reviewed for correct-
ness. 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>391 
The Court of Appeals grants an adminis-
trative rule a presumption of validity in de-
termining whether the rule is consistent with 
governing statutes. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON : 
personally, DAN SCOTT and : 
JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE : 
E. DOMS, : 
Defendants : 
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal 
representative of the Estate of 
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON 
personally, DAN SCOTT and 
JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third-party Plaintiffs 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Third-party Defendant 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NO 
F I L E D 
: Civil No. 8339 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal : 
representative of the Estate of : 
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and : 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, : 
Plaintiffs : 
vs. : 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate : 
and politic of the State of : 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his : 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah 
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants 
: Civil No. 10066 
: (Judge John A. Rokich) 
Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April 
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990. An 
evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and 
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were 
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq.. 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq., 
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq.. Third-Party Defendant, Summit County 
Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq.. After 
hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary 
evidence as was admitted, memoranda filed by counsel herein, 
considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing, 
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain 
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the 
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992, 
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and heaving further 
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which 
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney 
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said 
amended and supplemental pleadings; hereby enters its "Second 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows: 
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs in this case, as grantors, conveyed to 
Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a 
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots 
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more 
particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit IP as follows: 
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58, 
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat 
thereof, as filed and of record in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder. 
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City 
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, 
as filed and of record in the office of the 
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom 
any portion located within the railroad rights 
of way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page 
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, 
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed 
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and of record in the office of the Summit 
County Recorder, excepting therefrom any 
portion located within the railroad rights of 
way as described in those certain documents 
recorded as Entry No, 8176 in Book C at Page 
4 01, Entry No. 13 316 in Book H at Page 326, 
and Entry No. 13 610 in Book H at Page 373, 
records of Summit County, Utah. 
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and 
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five 
feet of the following described Lots. 
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City 
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of 
record in the office of the Summit County Records. 
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as 
the "Rossie Hills Property." 
2. The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 
November 12, 1981 (see Defendants Exhibit 63D) , is a valid 
contract for the sale of the Rossie Hills Property, and 
specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be 
by "Warranty Deed." 
3. All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties 
in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
Property by the aforementioned Warranty Deed referred to the 
documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed." 
4. The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four 
of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word 
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors 
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when said Deed was 
delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
5. Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language 
which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been 
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized 
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under Utah law. 
6. Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting 
language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which 
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings. 
7. Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the'time Doms and 
McCoy purchased the property was via a graded right-of-way 
extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-of-
way south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D. 
8. After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway 
continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was 
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will 
hereafter be designated as the loop road. (See Defendants Exhibit 
77D.) 
9. The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has 
been in use for in excess of 40 years. 
10. Said loop road has been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario 
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie 
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date 
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by 
grantors to Defendant doms. Such use was for ingress and egress 
to the rear of their property, and for parking. 
11. Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are 
encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by 
adjoining property owners to the west. (See Defendants Exhibit 
77D.) 
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12. The encroachments protrude from 12-16 feet onto the 
Rossie Hills Property. 
13. These encroachments, including the backyard areas 
bordered by said fences, had been used openly, notoriously, 
continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years 
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and 
such use continues through present time. 
14. At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie 
Hills Property, Plaintiffs had knowledge of the aforementioned 
encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their 
agent, Mike Sloan. 
15. Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the 
aforesaid encumbrances prior to the delivery of the Deed to 
Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter. 
16. Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie 
Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore, 
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such 
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances. 
17. The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the 
amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($276,750.00). (See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.) 
18. The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction, 
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One 
Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($194,250.00). 
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19. In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills 
property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy 
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
(See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 2P and 3P.) Said Trust Deed Note was in 
the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 'Hundred Fifty 
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up 
to and including January 10fl 985. The Note also provided that the 
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January 
25, 1985. 
20. The amount of each monthly payment was to be Two Thousand 
Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25). 
21. Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall 
be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the 
reduction of principal." 
22. Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments 
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note. (See Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 6P.) 
23. The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. 
McCoy was located in a platted subdivision. 
24. The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots 
in Block 58 and 59 were accessible by McHenry Avenue. (See 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 99P.) 
25. The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not 
a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because 
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed 
as a roadway. 
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26. The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential 
development. 
27. At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it 
was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single, 
duplex and tri-plex dwellings to be constructed upon'the property. 
28. The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is 
affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments 
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped. 
29. Plaintiffs1 appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of 
March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to 
the loop road and encroachments was around Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000.00). 
30. Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as 
of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One 
Hundred Sixty-Six Thousand Dollars ($166,000.00) if the 
encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten 
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and 
encumbrances cannot be relocated. 
31. McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by 
a judicial determination. 
32. Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and 
marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the 
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy. 
33. Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent, 
in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie 
Hills Property. 
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34. Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the 
sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy 
purchased the property. 
35. Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was 
a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use 
would be as an integrated development with the two adjoining 
parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel. 
36. Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the 
Slipper parcel in October of 1982. 
37. The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to 
further the integrated development of the three parcels and to 
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel 
and Block 62. 
38. In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn, 
an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of 
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners 
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an 
integrated development. 
39. Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property, 
Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the 
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard 
Kohler. 
40. Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased 
the Rossie Hills Property and the Slipper parcel that the 
integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of 
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of 
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel. 
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41. Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr, Sloan in 
the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the 
property. 
42. Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments 
would not affect development and an access road to* the property 
would be in the same place as the loop road. 
43. Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for 
the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7, 
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984. 
44. Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until 
January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer 
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred 
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985. Said 
settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs 
through Defendant Doms1 attorney, Gerald H. Kinghom, in which 
Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in 
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust 
Deed Note. 
45. Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but 
rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of 
1985. 
46. Doms1 purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to 
develop the three parcels as an integrated development, the 
subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems 
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had 
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than 
October of 1982. 
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47. It was not until Plaintiffs1 action to foreclose was 
filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June 
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed. 
48. Defendant Doms failed to file his claim for damages 
against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the 
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided 
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
49. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed 
on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County 
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of 
Entry. 
50. The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not 
"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the 
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of 
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs. 
51. The Court does not believe it should interfere with the 
agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services 
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully 
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the 
case. 
52. The attorneys for plaintiffs and defendant have kept 
detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case 
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of 
what was transpiring in the case. 
53. The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be 
construed as negating the clientfs obligation to pay the attorneys 
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement. 
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54- The Court finds that the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase" which was signed by some of the parties in November 
1981 was merged into the later Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982. 
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979). 
(a) The said Warranty Deed did not provide for payment 
of attorney fees in an action based upon breach of warranties 
contained in the said Deed. 
55. The Court finds that purchasers of real estate are not 
entitled to attorney fees absent an express agreement providing 
therefore, unless the purchaser commences a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. George A. Lowe Co. v. 
Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911). 
(a) Doms has not commenced a separate action against 
third parties to remove encumbrances. 
56. The Court finds the plaintiffs1 complaint in foreclosure 
as well as all other actions by the plaintiffs were not instituted 
or prosecuted in bad faith. 
57. The Counsel for plaintiffs and Doms aggressively and 
zealously presented their cases and neither party acted in bad 
faith. 
58. The Court finds that Doms is not entitled to attorney 
fees. 
59. The defendant Doms is not entitled to any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages. 
60. Doms is entitled to the following costs for the 
prosecution of his Second Amended Counterclaim: 
(a) Service of process on Jeanne Scott $ 12.00 
(b) Service of process on Ellen Anderson $ 12.75 
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(c) Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan $ 24.75 
(d) Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen $ 34.00 
(e) Recording fee for corrected Sheriff's $ 18.00 
Deed 
(f) The said costs awarded to Doms total* $101.50 
61. The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees 
and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the 
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided 
that all costs and expenses of collection including reasonable 
attorney fees can be charged against the maker. 
62. The Court finds that counsel for the plaintiffs and 
defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case 
and their time sheets so reflect. 
63. The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for 
plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable. 
64. The Court finds that Plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, at page 12 of his affidavit dated December 6, 1991, 
states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the 
Second Amended Counterclaim." 
(a) The time spent on collection of the Note and 
foreclosure action by plaintiffs1 counsel was nominal in comparison 
to all the hours expended in this case. 
(b) The Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the 
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for 
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in 
the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
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65. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney 
fees for legal services incurred in the prosecution of the 
collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside 
default, to compel sanctions, setting aside the tax sale, 
intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
66- In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will 
take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the 
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a 
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms. 
67. The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based 
upon Judge J. Dennis Frederick's ruling that plaintiffs were 
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and 
for sanctions before the court. 
68. The criteria for the Courtfs decision awarding attorney 
fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 
(Utah 1988). 
69. The Court understands the amount in controversy can be 
a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not 
putting much reliance on this factor. 
70. The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney 
fees as follows: 
(a) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ,: 
(i) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 5,245.00 
(ii) Petition for intermediate appeal $ 2,7 3 0.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ $ 2,160.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $12,300.00 
(v) For the motion to compel and for 
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's 
minute entries $ 4,750.00 
(vi) The total amount to be awarded for 
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is $27,185.00 
(b) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ.: 
(i) Motion to set aside default $ 4,467.00 
(This amount has already been 
paid by Doms) 
(ii) Lawsuit to set aside tax sale $ 1,050.00 
(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ 
and mandamus $ 2,740.00 
(iv) For the foreclosure complaint $10,000.00 
(v) The total amount to be awarded 
for Mr. Biele's fees is $13,790.00 
71. The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to the 
following costs: 
(a) Summit County Cleric — filing Complaint $ 50.00 
(b) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of Third-Party Summons and Complaint $ 16.50 
(c) Summit County Clerk — filing fee for 
Complaint in Civil No. 10066 $ 75.00 
(d) Richie Zabriskie — fee for service 
of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy 
Enterprises Inc. $ 2 4.70 
(e) Utah Supreme Court — docketing fee 
for filing Petition for Intermediate 
Appeal $12 5.00 
(f) Utah Supreme Court — filing fee for 
Petition for Extraordinary Writ of 
Prohibition $ 50.00 
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(g) Summit County Clerk — fee for 
certification of order $ 3.50 
(h) Steve Deckert — witness fee for 
attending trial $ 30-00 
(i) LeRoy J. Pia — witness fee 
to attend trial $ 50.00 
(j) The total amount of the said costs 
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is $358.20 
72. The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for 
payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per 
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after 
default. 
SECOND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was 
a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the 
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 57-
1-12. 
2. The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by 
said fences, and decks are encroachments and constitute 
encumbrances upon the property. 
3. Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property 
on the date of the delivery of the Deed, which was March 23, 1982. 
4. Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory 
covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section 
57-1-12. 
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5. The aforesaid statutory covenants contained in the 
Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed 
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982. 
6. The Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract. 
7. The Court believes that the law applicable to this case 
is: The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the 
contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the 
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009). 
8. The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell 
Company v. Brown. 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth 
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case 
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note 
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract. 
9. The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the 
same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the 
property. The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure 
the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the 
property is free and clear of encumbrances. 
10. Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of 
the statutory covenants of warranty. 
11. The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely 
affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the 
value of the property is diminished. 
12. Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1 
breach. 
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13. Defendant Doms f damages should be measured as of the date 
of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery 
of the Deed. 
14. Said damages should be measured with all of the 
encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982. 
15. The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the 
difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances 
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances. 
16. The loop road does have a beneficial value for the 
development of the Rossie Hills Property. 
17. Under Utah law, it was the Plaintiffs1 burden and 
obligation to mitigate the damages suffered by Defendant doms 
because Plaintiffs were in breach of the statutory covenants 
contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered. 
18. Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the 
Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and 
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been 
mitigated. 
19. As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie 
Hills Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant Doms has suffered 
damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00). 
20. Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two 
Hundred Seventy=Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($276,750.00) purchase price of the property, in the amount of 
Eighty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00), which 
represents the earnest money payment of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five 
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00). 
21. The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-
Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($82,500.00) is One Hundred 
Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), which 
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the 
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed. 
22. Defendant Doms is further entitled to an additional 
offset of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00), which 
represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of 
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above. 
23. Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date 
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed. 
24. From April 0, 1982 through January 10, 1985, monthly 
interest payments under the Trust Deed Note were received by 
Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred Ninety-
Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than 
One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance 
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time. 
25. under the terms of the Trust Deed Note, the amount 
actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal 
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars 
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and 
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44). 
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26. Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in 
the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100 
Dollars ($72,520,25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an 
additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and 
81/100 Dollars ($30,986.81), which represents the difference 
between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) and the interest which was 
actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period. 
27. Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due 
under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the 
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note. 
28. Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined 
and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1 
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature. 
29. Without the necessity of refiling this action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give 
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have 
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees, 
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the 
Notice of Default. The giving of the Notice of Default shall not 
take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be 
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney. Service on the 
Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the 
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Defendant's last known address. 
30. The Court recognizes that there are two options by which 
to foreclose a note and trust deed, administratively or judicially. 
Due to the circumstances in this case, the failure of Plaintiffs 
to ascertain damages prior to proceeding with the foreclosure 
action, Defendant Doms should be given 90 days' notice to satisfy 
the Note before Plaintiffs can proceed with the foreclosure action. 
31. Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid balance 
of Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three and 19/100 Dollars 
($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal 
balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note. The 
interest rate to be used in determining the amount due Plaintiffs 
as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum. 
32. If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing 
after notice, Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure upon 
filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay. The 
Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a 
Judgment of foreclosure based either on the administrative 
foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seq. , 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure 
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg.. 
33. In regard to the issue of whether or not Defendant Doms 
was entitled to rescind the contract, the Court concludes that 
Defendant Doms was bound to take remedial action after the Fall of 
1981 which the Court determined to be the date he was made aware 
of the encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the 
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purchase of the Slipper parcel. 
34. It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal 
opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the 
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills 
Property before he could make his tender to rescind.. 
35. Once Defendant Doms knew of the road and the 
encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time 
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction. 
36. The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and 
North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable 
to this case in that Eaeter stands for the proposition, among 
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and 
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open 
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of 
its existence. 
37. Eaeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the 
instant case because there is not question that the road in this 
case has been used and was being used. 
38. The Eaeter case is applicable to the instant case in the 
sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking 
to rescind the contract must do so promptly after obtaining 
knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long 
as he acts within a reasonable time. 
39. Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after 
he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were 
upon the Rossie Hills Property. 
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40. The Court concludes that Defendant Doms waited an 
unreasonable amount of time to seek rescission; therefore, 
rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred 
by the doctrine of laches. 
41. Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry 
the burden of proof that Plaintiffs committed fraud and 
misrepresentation in this matter. 
42. With regard to Civil No. 10066, and Count I of 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation 
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987, 
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be 
declared to be null and void. 
43. The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to 
affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner 
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises, 
Inc. , a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the 
said tax sale. The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax 
sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any 
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property. 
44. The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy 
Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property 
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred 
legal title to Defendant Doms. 
45. In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in 
Defendant Doms, subject to Plaintiffs1 right to foreclose as 
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previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law, 
46. In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil 
NO, 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the 
Court on Motion of Summit County. 
47. In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against 
Third-Party Defendant Summit County Title Company in Civil No. 
8 3 39, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by 
the Court on Motion of said parties. 
48. Defendant doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim seeking 
damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing 
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates 
to the issues of damages. 
49. This Court has In personam jurisdiction over Plaintiff 
Jeanne Scott pursuant to a ruling by the Utah Supreme Court 
contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs' Petition 
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case 
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the 
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ, 
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne 
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a 
proper party to Defendant Domsf Second Amended Counterclaim under 
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
50. Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are 
denied. 
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51. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A. 
Mcintosh, Esq. 
52. The plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees of 
$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. 
Biele, Esq. 
53. The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which 
they have incurred in these proceedings. 
54. The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen 
percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has 
determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March 
10, 1982, both before and after default. 
55. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney 
fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 83 39 
or Civil No. 10066. 
56. The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment 
interest on the $83,000.00 damages described in the original 
Judgment dated September 9, 1991. 
57. The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs 
for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim. 
DATED this /£ day of June 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE JOHN 
-B-i'strict Court 
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X£\ COUNTY /^i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of May, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the above and foregoing SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand delivered to the following: 
Larry R. Keller, Esq. 
257 East 200 South, Suite 340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAMES A- MCINTOSH 
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ADDENDUM 3 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Michael R. McCoy; and Eugene E. Poms, 
Defendant, Appellee, and 
Cross-Appellant, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, Appellants, 
and Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County Title Company, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants, and 
Appellees, 
Ellen Anderson, as personal representa-
tive of the Estate of D.C. Anderson; 
Ellen Anderson, personally; Dan Scott 
and Jeanne Scott, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Summit County, a body corporate and 
politic of the State of Utah; and Blake 
L. Frazier, in his official capacity as 
Summit County Auditor; Gump & Ayers Real 
Estate, Inc., a Utah corporation; Victor 
R. Ayres; Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a 
Utah corporation; Eugene E. Poms; 
unknown defendants described as John 
Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellant. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MOV 0 4 3 t 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
(Not For 
Publication) 
Case No. 920653-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 4, 1994) 
Third District, Summit County 
The Honorable John A. Rokich 
Attorneys: Irving H. Biele and Curtis C. Nesset, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Larry R. Keller and Craig L. Boorman, Salt Lake City, 
for Cross-Appellant Eugene Doms 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Appellants raise several challenges to the trial court's 
determination to allow appellee (Doms) to proceed with his 
counterclaim. Appellants' arguments relating to the counterclaim 
include whether the statute of limitations barred the 
counterclaim, whether the counterclaim related back to the date 
appellants filed their foreclosure action, whether the deed Doms 
obtained from Domcoy was valid, whether Doms was the real party 
in interest, whether Doms was a remote grantee, and whether the 
trial court improperly joined involuntary plaintiffs. We agree 
with the trial court's decision to allow Doms to proceed with his 
counterclaim and find appellants' arguments to be without merit. 
Thus, we decline to address them. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 
886, 896 (Utah 1989) (court may decline to address arguments 
without merit on appeal). 
In his cross-appeal, Doms asserts that the trial court 
improperly applied the equitable doctrine of laches and refused 
to rescind the Rossi Hills transaction. "To successfully assert 
a laches defense, a defendant must establish both that the 
plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an action and that the 
defendant was prejudiced by that delay." Borland v. Chandler, 
733 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1987); accord Papanikolas Brothers Enter, 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assocs.. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975) ; Utah Deot. of Transp. v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
751 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1988) (defendant must establish 
prejudice before laches defense may be successfully asserted); 
see In re Petition of Merrill Cook, 249 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 
1994) (denying petition because petitioners failed to act with 
reasonable diligence and because relief requested "could work a 
substantial hardship on the State"). 
The trial court made findings concerning Doms's delay in 
bringing the action but made no findings as to whether appellants 
were prejudiced by the delay.1 Therefore, we remand this case to 
1. W«a note that we do not agree that any time property increases 
:r decreases in value, the prejudice prong of the laches defense 
is automatically met. See Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 988 
(Utah 1958) ("natural increment" in value of property does not 
constitute prejudice in laches claim); see also West Los Angeles 
Institute for Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 228 (9th 
Cir. 1966) (mere increase or decrease in property value does not 
(continued...) 
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the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact 
relevant to whether appellants were prejudiced by any delays in 
Doms pursuing his counterclaim. If the trial court cannot find 
from the evidence presented that the appellants were prejudiced 
by the delay, the equitable doctrine of laches should not bar the 
remedy of rescission.2 Accordingly, we remand this case to the 
trial court. 
Nor^kn H. Jackson 
WE CONCUR: 
Cftidith M. B i l l i n g s , Judge* 
5enwondJ Jud reenwoodT1 Judge 
1. (...continued) 
alone convert delay into laches); Fitzgerald v. O'Connell, 386 
A.2d 1384, 1388 (R.I. 1978); (fact that property appreciated does 
not in and of itself convert delay into laches); Lincoln v. 
Fisher, 339 P.2d 1084, 1098 (Or. 1959). 
A change in property value is one factor courts should 
consider in determining prejudice. Lawson v. Hanves, 170 F.2d 
741, 744 (10th Cir. 1948); Filler v. Richland County. 806 P.2d 
537, 540 (Mont. 1991); Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 159 
(Utah 197 6). Further, other courts have determined that a change 
in property value did not prejudice landowners because the change 
could be taken into account by a court of equity in fashioning a 
just remedy. Small v. Badenhop. 701 P.2d 647, 658 (Haw. 1985). 
2. Because it is possible that the trial court will order the 
contract rescinded due to lack of evidence in the record 
concerning prejudice, we need not address the other claims 
raised. However, in the event the trial court does not rescind 
the transaction, the trial court should note that its findings 
and conclusions do not adequately treat the effect of the 
intervening conveyances to and from Domcoy on Doms's right to 
pursue his counterclaims and the effect of the default judgment 
entered against McCoy and the sheriff's sale of McCoy's interest 
in Rossi Hills on Doms's ownership interest in the property and 
any damages for breach of title warranties. 
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F I L E D 
LARRY R. KELLER, #1785 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant Eugene E. Doms 
525 East 100 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo— 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate MODIFIED JUDGMENT 
of D.C. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, 
and JEANNE SCOTT, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND 
EUGENE E. DOMS, : 
Defendants. 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal, Civil No. 8339 
Representative of the Estate : 
of DC. ANDERSON, DAN SCOTT, 
ELLEN ANDERSON, personally, : 
and JEANNE SCOTT, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, : 
Third Party Defendant. ; 
JUL - 7 2001 
•*>»ra^»uict Court 
ueputy Clerk, S u ^ ^ ^ — f ) f 
ELLEN ANDERSON, as Personal : 
representative of the Estate of 
D,C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and 
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate Civil No. 10066 
and politic of the State of 
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZDBR, in his 
official capacity as Summit 
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS 
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah ; 
corporation; VICTOR R AYERS; 
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a 
Utah corporation; EUGENE E. 
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS : 
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5, ; 
Defendants. 
ooOoo — 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on June 29, 2000 on Defendant Doms' 
Motion to Enter Judgment on the June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals with Irving 
H. Biele, Esq. present and representing Plaintiffs and Larry R. Keller, Esq. present and representing 
Defendant Eugene E. Doras. 
This Court finds and determines that despite the efforts on the part of Plaintiffs to continue to 
axgue matters conclusively decided in the June 24, 1999 Decision of the Utah Coin! of Appeals, and 
upheld by the Utah Supreme Court when it denied Certiorari in this matter, Judgment according to 
the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals should be entered as follows: 
2 
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1. Recission as ordered by the Court of Appeals is the appropriate remedy in this matter, 
2. Defendant Eugene E. Doms has been determined by the Utah Court of Appeals to be 
M y entitled to all amounts paid under the contract upon its recission, and this Court 
declines to rule differently than the UtaJh Court of Appeals on that point since that 
Court found Doms to be entitled to a refund of monies paid as one of the original 
buyers of the property, and as the successor in interest to McCoy and DomCoy. 
3. Doms shall tender back to Plaintiffs all right, title and interest to the property subject 
to his receiving the following sums: 
a. $10,000,00 earnest money at 10% interest from the date of payment which 
shall be the sum of $28,731.5] through August 1, 2000 and $2.74 per day 
thereafter; 
b. The sum of $72,500,00 constituting the down payment at 10% simple interest 
which shall be the sum of $205,959.59 through August 1, 2000 and $19.86 
per day thereafter; 
c. All payments made for taxes on the property at 10% interest from the date the 
payment was made which shall be the sum of $23,070.73 through August 1, 
2000 and $4.26 per day thereafter. 
4. Payments made pursuant to the Trust Deed Note which were interest payments shall 
not be recoverable by Defendant Doms. It is the Court's opinion that had the money 
been borrowed from any other party, Defendant Doms would have had to repay it 
The Court cannot see a legal basis for allowing this interest on the Trust Deed Note 
3
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to be returned to Defendant Doms and so the interest payments shall not be recovered 
by Doms. 
5. The Court of Appeals has directed this Court to reduce the Judgment by fair rental 
value; however the Court finds that the record is completely devoid of any basis for 
rental value for this raw ground which had never been used in any way by Defendant 
Doms. Therefore the Court declines to reduce the Judgment in this case by any rental 
value, finding there is no fair rental value to be placed upon the property. 
6. The Court chooses not to revisit the attorney's fees issue as such fees were necessary 
to set aside the Default Judgment in this case; therefore no award is made for 
recovery of said attorney's fees by Defendant Doms. 
7. This Court finds that there has been an unwillingness on thepgiLaf^ 
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and^khSugh the Court does not believe that 
Plaintiffs7 counsel has intenJieriaOy attempted to mislead it, there clearly has been a 
breach of Rule>Kvith regard to arguments made by counsel and the sum of $500.00 
j^s^arded as attorney's fees to Defendant Doms. 
8. All amounts awarded here shall bear judgment at the legal post-judgment interest rate 
from the date this Judgment is entered. 
^S-
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DATED this 7 ' day of 
BY THE COURT: 
KdBEKT HlLDER 
District Court Judge 
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